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ABSTRACT 
As campus speech codes enjoy a renaissance surrounding microaggressions and trigger 
warnings, understanding how and whether such speech codes can stand up to constitutional 
scrutiny is crucial. This project offers a historical overview of the evolution of free speech in 
U.S. history, with a particular focus on the jurisprudential history of hate speech and the “first 
wave” of litigation surrounding campus speech codes in the 1980s and ’90s. I use two theoretical 
frameworks, liberalism and communitarianism, to analyze the judiciary’s response to speech 
codes and to understand whether that response aligns with either framework. Lastly, I offer three 
proposals for future consideration of speech codes in the courts, with an emphasis on current 
speech controversies. My primary research question is this: Have the judiciary’s decisions 
regarding campus speech codes been more similar to a liberal or a communitarian conception of 
speech, and should a new approach be considered as colleges move into a new era of speech 
regulations?  
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INTRODUCTION 
 At colleges across the United States, students are requesting — and in some cases 
demanding — greater protection from speech they consider harmful. In a contrast from the 
student protests of the 1960s, students have largely stopped pressing for greater freedom of 
speech and are instead campaigning to limit speech that, in their view, prevents colleges and 
universities from being truly pluralistic (Zeitz 2015). Specifically, today’s students are more 
aware of “microaggressions,” or everyday slights against people of color, women, and other 
minority groups, and “triggers,” or material that could cause severe flashbacks to traumatic 
incidents in students with PTSD. Many students see microaggressions and triggering material as 
impediments to learning for those who are most affected by them. 
 Some student requests, however, have been widely viewed as infringements of free 
speech and part of a larger push to institute mandatory “political correctness.” In cases where 
students have demanded mandatory trigger warnings (requiring professors to label potentially 
triggering material) or where administrators have acquiesced to students by implementing 
microaggression trainings (some of which appear to censure particular viewpoints), pushback 
from faculty, dissenting students, pundits, and even politicians has followed. President Obama 
himself criticized the culture of political correctness on college campuses, saying in an interview 
that it is “a recipe for dogmatism” (Chait 2015). Republican presidential candidates have widely 
mocked college students, tapping into a general feeling among members of the public that 
political correctness has gone too far — 68% believe that political correctness is a “big problem” 
in the United States (Edsall 2015). Even basketball legend Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (2016) recently 
entered the fray, arguing in an opinion piece for The Washington Post that political correctness is 
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a laudable goal but that mandatory microaggression trainings and trigger warnings go a step too 
far. 
 Are these concepts really such a threat to free speech, or are they in fact a useful tool in 
bringing more voices into academia? The case for limiting some speech is that the students who 
are most affected by it are prevented from fully participating in educational opportunities. A 
student who has to put up with racial microaggressions every day, or a student with PTSD who is 
triggered by discussions of violence in classes, cannot access educational advantages in the same 
way a white student, or a student without PTSD, is able to. From this perspective, providing 
guidelines about how to avoid microaggressions or requiring that professors offer warnings on 
material that could be triggering, actually serves to allow more speech by inviting more students 
into academic discussions. 
  This complex debate, which I will discuss in greater detail in the chapters to follow, 
becomes even more complicated when we consider the legality of campus speech regulations. 
We can look to recent history to find the courts’ views on the matter — in the 1980s and ’90s, 
campus speech codes were implemented at more than 300 schools (Shiell 1998). A number of 
the codes were challenged in court, and not a single one survived judicial scrutiny. What does 
this judicial history imply about the speech battles taking place on campuses today? This 
Independent Study project seeks to place this question in historical and legal perspective and to 
offer proposals for how colleges can balance free speech and students’ rights to equal 
educational opportunities.  
This issue is particularly timely because 2015 saw an explosion of protests on college 
campuses, many of which touched on issues of speech and equality. As such, the issue of 
whether speech regulations violate free speech has become all the more urgent. For an example 
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of how a speech regulation can blur the line between protecting students and stifling speech, we 
need look no further than a recent incident at The College of Wooster. Importantly, The College 
of Wooster is a private school, and thus not held to the same standards of free speech as a public 
school. But The College of Wooster’s example demonstrates the importance of studying how 
speech regulations are implemented and how they could be used inappropriately at a public 
institution. 
 In November of 2015, a group of anonymous students protested The College of 
Wooster’s handling of sexual assault cases by disseminating hundreds of posters in dormitories 
and academic buildings around campus. The posters portrayed silhouetted college students 
making statements such as “Wooster told my rapist that persuasion is consent,” “My rapist gets 
to walk at graduation,” and “The administration told me not to talk about my suicide attempt.” 
The posters were distributed late at night, but were immediately noticed by many students and, 
crucially, resident assistants. Before administrators had even been alerted to the posters, RAs 
began removing them because they believed the posters’ content could be “triggering” to victims 
of sexual assault. The RAs sought to protect victims of trauma from unwanted images and 
messages when they took down the posters; however, in doing so, however, the RAs silenced 
their classmates’ protest and thwarted a larger discussion about the handling of sexual assault on 
Wooster’s campus.  
Although many students supported the removal of the posters because of their content, 
it’s significant that administrators quickly latched onto the idea of triggering content as a 
justification for the posters’ removal. The morning after the poster campaign went up, 
administrators told Resident Assistants to continue tearing down any posters they had missed, as 
the campaign was “violating our posting policy and triggering a number of our students,” 
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according to an email. As a private institution, The College of Wooster has far more leeway in 
regulating speech than would a public school in this situation. The College may set posting 
policies inside its buildings, and it may decide what posters to remove from its property. But this 
reasoning was not emphasized in an email to the student body that went out two days after the 
posters went up; rather, Administrative Director of Student Life Angela Johnston informed 
students that the posters were removed because they provided false information about the sexual 
assault reporting process, violated Title IX by publicizing identifiable information about 
survivors of rape, and because “Residence Life staff immediately heard from a number of 
students who felt triggered by these posters” (personal communication 2015). 
Of these three explanations for the posters’ removal, the first two do not explain why all 
of the posters had to be removed. If some of the posters contained false information, those 
specific posters could be removed without silencing the entire protest. If some of the posters 
included information that could be used to identify participants (victims or the accused) in a 
sexual assault case, those specific posters could be removed or administrators could make an 
effort to discover whether the information was publicized with permission from the sexual 
assault survivors, which presumably does not violate Title IX — especially if that information 
was given for the express purpose of pointing out flaws in the sexual assault reporting process. 
Only the final explanation, the idea that the posters triggered students, is broad enough to justify 
the removal of all of the posters, because it is based upon the claim that any poster relating to 
sexual assault could act as a trigger. 
Thus, administrators were able to appropriate the concept of “triggering” for their own 
purposes and shut down a protest of school policies. In a dizzying contradiction, a concept that 
was created by marginalized groups to protect themselves from oppressive systems of power 
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(trigger warnings) was utilized by those in power to silence a protest aimed at protecting a 
marginalized group: the victims of sexual assault. And in doing so, administrators were able to 
end the protest without sparking significant outrage among the student body; in fact, significant 
student outrage was directed at the coordinators of the poster campaign for their lack of concern 
over the safety of those who might be triggered.  
This is just one example of the many controversies that have popped up at colleges since 
terms like microaggressions and trigger warnings first became popularized. This case gives a 
sample of the difficulties colleges face in balancing students’ needs and rights, as well as the 
possibility of misuse or misinterpretation by the administrators who apply speech codes. College 
campuses are once again a central battleground in a fight to redefine free speech — this time, 
however, student opinions seem to favor less speech, rather than more. It is crucial that these 
debates be analyzed and understood, and this project seeks to make a contribution to that 
understanding. 
In Chapter One, I will offer a general overview of free speech in U.S. history, going back 
to the nation’s birth, as well as more detailed descriptions of recent noteworthy Supreme Court 
cases that have formed the foundation of modern free speech jurisprudence as it relates to this 
new controversy. Chapter One also provides a synopsis of the “first wave” of campus speech 
codes, which took place in the 1980s and ’90s, and considers those speech codes and the lawsuits 
they inspired as a jumping-off point for understanding the issues of today. In Chapter Two, I will 
examine two competing theoretical models of free speech: liberalism, which is oriented toward 
individual rights; and communitarianism, which is oriented toward shared communal values. 
Chapter Three will be comprised of my analyses of a series of essential Supreme Court free 
speech cases and several campus speech code cases from the first wave of speech codes using 
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these two models. In Chapter Four, I will introduce today’s speech debates surrounding 
microaggressions and trigger warnings, and in Chapter Five I will offer three proposals for how 
colleges and the courts should resolve questions over campus speech codes and relieve the 
double-bind in which colleges find themselves caught between ensuring individual freedom of 
speech and offering equal opportunities to education. 
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CHAPTER ONE: FREE SPEECH AND HATE SPEECH HISTORIES 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” 
- First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
 
I. Overview of Free Speech in United States History 
Like most areas of constitutional law, the core of the First Amendment is a battle between 
personal freedoms and the needs of society at large. In various times in American history, the 
pendulum has swung in favor of one side or another, but neither can declare a decisive victory. 
The meaning of the First Amendment has changed drastically since the Founders drafted it. How 
can an amendment that was once thought to have referred to only an absence of prior restraints 
now defend hate speech and seditious libel? The answer, in part, lies in the Supreme Court, 
which has played a major role in shaping the First Amendment and the freedom it provides. 
Here, I offer a brief overview of the First Amendment in U.S. history with a focus on the shift 
from protecting “the greater good,” or the necessary social order, to protecting personal 
freedoms. 
After the American Revolutionary War, the scales were tipped decisively in favor of the 
greater good, and personal freedoms were allowed to fall by the wayside. Although they were 
free of the yoke of English rule, the Founders did not take a more enlightened approach to free 
speech than did their former sovereign. O’Brien writes that, upon ratification of the Constitution, 
the First Amendment was thought to provide significantly fewer protections than it does today: 
“The [First] amendment was thought to protect only against prior restraint by the national 
government; it did not provide absolute immunity for what speakers or publishers might utter or 
print” (2011, 434).  
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The First Amendment did not, at the time, refer to much more than an absence of prior 
restraint, or government suppression, of what was published by the press. Beyond that, the 
Founders did not place much emphasis on the personal freedoms we now consider synonymous 
with the First Amendment, such as the freedom to express unpopular political views. The 
Founders were generally agreed upon the idea that seditious libel — speaking or publishing ideas 
aimed at promoting insurrection — should be punishable by law, an idea that was not unusual for 
the time (O’Brien 2011). Ensuring the continued existence of the union by limiting opposition 
was considered the ultimate “greater good” that could justify the suppression of disfavored 
viewpoints. 
The Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 demonstrated the Founders’ belief in criminalizing 
opposing political viewpoints. The Sedition Act allowed for the punishment of “any false, 
scandalous writing against the government of the United States.” (O’Brien 2011, 435). The Alien 
Act allowed the removal of aliens whom the president “suspected of ‘treasonable or secret 
machinations against the government’” (Tedford 1985, 41, citing the Alien Act). 
Tedford writes that the Sedition Act and similar acts of the same year were aimed at 
quieting ongoing disputes with France between 1793 and 1800, but they also had the convenient 
effect of chilling discourse among the political enemies of the Federalist Party and of President 
John Adams. “The measures against aliens, therefore, served the dual purposes of revenge upon 
France and protection for the incumbent party,” he writes (Tedford 1985, 41). Both Acts were 
allowed to expire in the first years of the nineteenth century, without ever coming before the 
Supreme Court for consideration. 
A free and open debate was not, then, a priority of the Founders. The ability of the 
government to restrict expression continued to be the norm for decades. After 1812, when the 
	   9 
Supreme Court ruled that the federal government did not have authority to establish a “common 
law of crimes, including the crime of seditious libel,” constitutional commentators continued to 
believe the states could limit individual speech that caused “public offense” in its “blasphemy, 
obscenity, or scandalous character” (O’Brien 2011, 436–7) (quoting Thomas Cooley). O’Brien 
writes that the Blackstonian view of free speech — that speech could be punishable if it was 
deemed “improper, mischievous, or illegal” — was carried over from British Common Law and 
was standard in the United States during the nineteenth century (2011, 437).  
This early period was also characterized by the Supreme Court’s hesitance to intervene in 
state issues; without the Court’s leadership, however, speech was suppressed somewhat readily. 
“In the nineteenth century, lower courts, legislatures, government officials, and ultimately the 
shifting tides of public opinion enjoyed broad power to punish speech and press and thereby the 
power to deprive the rights of minorities to express unpopular views,” O’Brien writes (2011, 
437). This trend, which privileged “the greater good” (as perceived by the majority) over 
individual liberties, continued throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. The Civil 
War offered abundant opportunities for censorship, from a prohibition on abolitionist literature in 
the South to the suspension of students who “expressed the slightest understanding for the 
secessionist cause” at Northern universities (Stevens 1982, 42, citing Nelson 1967). The second 
half of the nineteenth century also bred censorship of the obscene by self-styled morality 
defenders. 
It was not until World War I and subsequent speech cases that the Supreme Court took on 
“the vexing responsibility of giving meaning to the First Amendment by developing standards 
and tests for determining the scope of constitutionally protected free speech and press” (O’Brien 
2011, 439). The first World War provided ample opportunity for the Court to do so — as Stevens 
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puts it, “In no other American crisis, before or since, were civil liberties so trampled. Thousands … were prosecuted under laws or by vigilantes for uttering remarks that some of their neighbors 
found ‘antiwar’” (1982, 44). In particular, the Espionage Act of 1917 criminalized any speech 
that interfered with the success of the military, a notion that was broadly interpreted. Fears of 
communism and anarchism also led to restrictive laws in many states. 
Although the Court did not find any of the World War I laws that restricted speech 
unconstitutional, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes used one of these cases, Schenk v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), to carve out a new standard for considering free speech cases. 
Holmes took the Court from the “bad tendency” doctrine, in which any speech that “had a 
reasonable tendency to undermine governmental stability at some future date” was not protected, 
to the “clear and present danger” doctrine (Shapiro 1966, 48). Quoting Justice Brandeis, Shapiro 
describes the clear and present danger requirement as “the probability of serious injury to the 
state,” heightening the threat necessary to declare speech unprotected (1966, 50).  
O’Brien writes that the clear and present danger doctrine was hopelessly warped after 
Chief Justice Vinson declared it to be a balancing test between the interests of the state and the 
speech interest in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). “In Vinson’s hands, the clear 
and present danger test became a balancing technique for rationalizing restrictions on speech,” 
O’Brien writes (2011, 446). Shapiro claims the shift from clear and present danger to a balancing 
test allowed the justices to side with Congress in almost every instance. In balancing between 
individual liberties and governmental interest, it was easy for the Court to side with the 
behemoth of government and “the greater good” associated with protecting the nation. Shapiro 
frames the balancing arguments this way: “The weight given national security may be so great as 
to wreck the scales entirely, for it is always tempting to argue in defense of any repression that 
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the preservation of our state is the fundamental prerequisite of all our liberties” (1966, 84). In 
this time period, protecting “the greater good” referred to protecting the United States from 
communists and other “undesirables” — during the Cold War, opponents of controversial views 
could easily argue that protecting speech on an individual basis might lead to an existential threat 
to the United States. Thus, “the greater good” won out in cases where the Supreme Court 
balanced individual freedoms against the need to defend the nation. After all, without a 
government, what use would speech protections be? 
By the latter half of the twentieth century, however, the Court developed a new method 
for considering speech cases — what O’Brien calls a “two-level theory or definitional balancing 
approach to the First Amendment” that firmly protects some types of speech (political speech, 
for instance) while designating a few categories of speech less deserving of protection (2011, 
439). Justice Murphy outlined this approach in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 
(1942), concluding that some types of speech, like “fighting words,” have so little social value as 
to be essentially unprotected by the First Amendment. 
The other categories of less protected speech are obscenity, libel, and commercial speech. 
Although the two-level theory has strengthened protection for personal freedoms, it remains 
controversial in some ways, particularly in how the Court decides which speech is deserving of 
protection and which is not. Although the categories of speech limit the use of balancing tests, 
the Court must still balance individual rights against government interest in determining whether 
certain forms of speech are protected or unprotected. Within each category of unprotected 
speech, there are circumstances in which speech that is normally considered “valueless” can still 
be protected. “Offensive speech may convey a political statement and hence be entitled to 
protection,” O’Brien writes. The creation of categories of speech that can be regulated is an 
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outcome of relatively recent free speech jurisprudence — so, too is the development of strong 
protections for political expression, expressive conduct, and other forms of speech.  
II. Survey of Modern Speech Cases 
The expansion of speech protections and the clarification of what speech is protected can 
be traced to a number of specific cases. As it stands today, the result of these cases is a complex 
web of precedents that leaves much unclear, especially in the realm of hate speech.1 The 
following is a chronological overview of key cases in the development of modern doctrines 
surrounding speech, based upon those cases that are frequently highlighted in the literature. 
Although not all of these cases deal directly with hate speech — in fact, most of them do not — 
they are relevant in the sense that they define the bounds within which the government and its 
agents may regulate speech and expressive conduct. 
A. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)*2 
In this case, a Jehovah’s Witness named Walter Chaplinsky referred to a police officer as 
“a God damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist” and was charged under a statute that “forbade 
addressing ‘any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person’” (Greenawalt 1995, 
50, citing the New Hampshire statute). The Court upheld the statute and Chaplinsky’s conviction 
on the grounds that Chaplinsky’s speech could be categorized as “fighting words.”3 Writing for 
the unanimous Court, Justice Murphy distinguished such words as a class of speech that was so 
harmful and of so little social value that the government’s interest in social order justified 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The meaning of the term “hate speech” is the subject of extensive debate. Where the term is used in this project, it 
is used in the sense that some might consider the speech in question to fall into the category of “hate speech,” not in 
the sense that there is general consensus that the speech is considered hateful. When the term is used in this thesis, 
readers should not assume that I am endorsing any particular view of whether the speech in question is “hate 
speech.” 
2 Cases marked with an asterisk will be described and analyzed in greater detail in Chapter Three, and thus 
explanations of those cases have been condensed in this chapter to limit repetition. 
3 Like “hate speech,” “fighting words” is a subjective characterization. Again, my use of the term to describe speech 
should not necessarily be taken to indicate my endorsement of that characterization. 
	   13 
regulating it. Chaplinsky was the first articulation of the “fighting words doctrine” in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. 
B. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)* 
A speech by Father Arthur Terminiello, delivered to a large audience, incited a crowd to 
riot because of its criticism of particular races, religions, and political groups. Terminiello was 
charged and found guilty of inciting a breach of the peace under a Chicago ordinance. In a 5-4 
majority, Justice Douglas wrote, “… A function of free speech under our system of government 
is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of 
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is 
often provocative and challenging” (337 U.S. 1, 4). The audience’s response to Terminiello’s 
speech, though severe, did not mean the government could prohibit his speech. The Court held 
that the speech could not be prohibited based upon an audience’s response to it. To regulate 
speech based upon the response it provokes would be to give angry crowds a “heckler’s veto,” 
allowing the silencing of unpopular views. The Court found that such an ordinance was 
untenable. 
C. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) 
 The White Circle League, led by Beauharnais, distributed leaflets depicting black 
Americans as dangerous criminals and asking for the Chicago city government to take action to 
protect whites.  Beauharnais was convicted of violating an Illinois law forbidding any person 
from distributing information that “portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue 
of a class of citizens, of any race, color, creed, or religion…” (343 U.S. 250, 251, citing the 
Illinois law). Beauharnais challenged the conviction on the grounds that it violated his First 
Amendment rights.  
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 The 5-4 majority, authored by Justice Frankfurter, found that Beauharnais’ conviction 
was legal because it fell under the category of “group libel.” The Court determined that the 
Illinois legislature had the right to take action against the racial violence that had plagued the 
state by prohibiting libel against groups on the basis of their race, religion or creed. Frankfurter 
wrote, “willful purveyors of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups promote strife and 
tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold adjustments required for free, ordered life in a 
metropolitan, poyglot community” (343 U.S. 250, 259). Because libelous statements are not 
protected speech, the Court found that the Illinois regulation was permissible. 
D. U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) 
 At the height of the Vietnam War, David O’Brien and three other men burned their draft 
registration certificates in front of a crowd on the steps of a Boston courthouse. Upon seeing this 
display, members of the crowd attacked O’Brien and his companions, at which point four FBI 
agents in the crowd stepped in to bring the card-burners to safety. At that point, O’Brien 
admitted to burning his draft card because of his antiwar beliefs. O’Brien was convicted of 
violating a federal law that prohibited “the knowing destruction or mutilation of certificates,” but 
appealed on the grounds that the law abridged free speech. 
 The Court held that the law was constitutional because it regulated conduct and had only 
an incidental effect on First Amendment freedoms. Although O’Brien’s conduct was intended to 
be expressive, Chief Justice Warren authored a unanimous decision that rejected O’Brien’s 
argument that burning the draft card was protected “symbolic speech.” It was instead deemed a 
“nonspeech element” of O’Brien’s conduct, which also happened to include the expression of 
antiwar beliefs (a “speech element”) (391 U.S. 367, 376). Because the law in question regulated 
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only the “noncommunicative aspect of O’Brien’s conduct,” the Court held that the law did not 
aim to suppress expression (391 U.S. 367, 382).  
The Court developed a four-pronged test to determine when Congress may regulate 
“nonspeech elements” of conduct that includes “speech elements”: “(1) Is the regulation within 
Congress’s authority to enact? (2) Does the regulation further a [substantial] government 
interest? (3) Is the regulation unrelated to the suppression of speech? And (4) Is the regulation 
only an incidental restriction on speech?” (O’Brien 2011, 674). The Court found that the law 
prohibiting the destruction of draft cards was not aimed at suppressing speech; rather, it sought to 
protect draft cards because of their importance to Congress’s ability to raise an army. Since this 
law furthered an important state interest and because it had only an incidental, rather than direct, 
impact on speech, the Court found it to be constitutional.  
The essential rule we can take from this case is that when speech is implicated in illegal 
conduct, that speech may be incidentally suppressed in the pursuit of a legitimate regulation of 
conduct, so long as the regulation is not targeting speech itself. Greenawalt characterizes the 
case’s implications this way: “If a law is not directed at speech, but speech is one means by 
which the law can be violated, the harm of content regulation of expression is avoided” (1995, 
82). 
E. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) 
 Clarence Brandenburg, a leader of a Ku Klux Klan chapter, called a Cincinnati television 
station to advertise a KKK rally, which members of the station attended and filmed. The footage 
showed 12 individuals carrying firearms and burning a cross in an Ohio field. It also caught 
snippets of a speech delivered by Brandenburg, in which he delivered implicit threats against the 
government (“‘…if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the 
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white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken’”) 
and against Jewish people and African Americans (395 U.S. 444, 446). Brandenburg was 
arrested and convicted of advocating violence under a 1919 Ohio anti-syndicalism statute that 
forbid “advocat[ing] . . . the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or 
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform” (395 
U.S. 444, 444–445). 
On appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the Ohio statute was an unconstitutional 
violation of First Amendment freedoms. In a per curiam decision, the Court held that “the 
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a state to forbid or proscribe 
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to 
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action” (395 
U.S. 444, 447). The promotion of violence is not enough, therefore, to allow the government to 
prohibit speech; under Brandenburg, “imminent lawless action must be the speaker’s objective 
and be actually likely to happen” (Greenawalt 1995, 18). 
 This decision marked a final, decisive shift away from the “clear and present danger” test 
and toward stronger speech protections. In his concurring opinion to Brandenburg, Justice 
Douglas indicates that the “clear and present danger” test failed to provide strong protection for 
First Amendment freedoms. Referring back to the World War I-era doctrine, Douglas writes, 
“Though I doubt if the ‘clear and present danger’ test is congenial to the First Amendment in 
time of a declared war, I am certain it is not reconcilable with the First Amendment in times of 
peace” (395 U.S. 444, 452) (Douglas, J. concurring). 
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F. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) 
 In 1968, Paul Robert Cohen walked through the Los Angeles County Courthouse wearing 
a jacket with the words “Fuck the Draft” inscribed on it. Cohen knowingly wore the jacket to 
express his feelings about the Vietnam War. He did not engage in any violent action or vocal 
protest while inside the Courthouse. Cohen was convicted of “‘maliciously and willfully 
disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person … by … offensive conduct” (403 
U.S. 15, 16, citing California Penal Code). 
 Authored by Justice Harlan, the 5-4 majority opinion first found that Cohen’s display of 
antiwar sentiment was speech, not conduct. Cohen’s message was not an action that could be 
considered expressive by only some; it was an act of communication aimed solely at expressing 
a message to a broader audience. Because Cohen took no action to actively evade the draft or 
engage in other illegal activity, his jacket’s message was considered speech. The Court also 
found that Cohen’s speech was not an example of fighting words, or words that are “inherently 
likely to provoke a violent reaction” and are thus unprotected (403 U.S. 15, 20). Because the 
words “Fuck the Draft” were not a personal insult directed at any individual, and nor did they 
incite violence, they were not deemed fighting words. Going further, the Court held that even if 
some members of the public might react with violence to Cohen’s message, that was not enough 
to deem the speech unprotected. The Court also determined that “four-letter words, however 
offensive, are not per se excluded from First Amendment protection,” and that those who were 
subjected to Cohen’s message in the Courthouse were not “captive audiences” (unable to escape 
Cohen’s message) (O’Brien 2011, 524). Consequently, Cohen limited the privacy rights of those 
who view offensive messages outside the home. 
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G. National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977)* 
 In a per curiam decision, the Court held that it was impermissible for the village of 
Skokie to block a petition to parade by the National Socialist Party of America. The Circuit 
Court of Cook County issued an injunction against the members of the National Socialist Party, 
prohibiting them from wearing party uniforms, displaying swastikas, or distributing materials 
that promoted hatred on the basis of race, religion or ancestry within the village of Skokie. The 
Illinois Supreme Court denied a request for a stay of the injunction. 
 In a brief opinion, the Court reversed the injunction on the National Socialist Party’s 
march, holding that the Illinois Supreme Court’s denial of a stay violated the National Socialist 
Party’s First Amendment freedoms during the appeals period. While the Party waited for its 
appeals to be considered by higher courts, it would be unconstitutionally blocked from marching 
(and from distributing material considered offensive by some).  
H. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) 
 During a protest at the 1984 Republican National Convention, Gregory Lee Johnson 
poured kerosene on an American flag and burned it in front of Dallas City Hall. Johnson was 
convicted of desecrating a venerated object under Texas law. The Court overturned that 
conviction, ruling in a 5-4 vote that Johnson’s action was expressive conduct that was protected 
under the First Amendment. Although burning the flag was conduct, not speech, the Court held 
that the conduct conveyed a message by testing whether “‘[a]n intent to convey a particularized 
message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it’” (491 U.S. 397, 404, citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 
405) Because Johnson burned the flag at a political demonstration, the majority deemed the act 
communicative enough to be deemed expressive conduct. 
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 After determining whether burning the flag was a form of expression, the Court turned to 
the question of whether the Texas law forbidding flag burning was related to the prohibition of 
expression. The state offered two potential interests in protecting the flag: the first, in preventing 
breaches of the peace that might erupt at the sight of a flag burning, and the second, in preserving 
the symbolic importance of the flag. The Court determined that the first interest was not 
implicated because no breach of the peace occurred when Johnson burned his flag and because 
his expression was not an example of fighting words, as it did not personally offend an 
individual to the point of violence. The second interest, in preserving the flag’s symbolism, was 
deemed illegitimate because it amounted to a content-based regulation of expression. Burning a 
flag for disposal purposes, the Court reasoned, would not have violated the Texas law; however, 
because Johnson burned the flag as a means of expression, he could be found in violation of the 
law. This suggested that the government favored one view of flag burning over others, making 
the law an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment. 
I. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)* 
 R.A.V., a minor, and several friends crafted a makeshift cross out of chair legs and 
burned it in the front lawn of an African-American neighbor. The teens were charged under St. 
Paul’s “Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance,” which forbade placing symbols or objects that 
“[arouse] anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender” (505 U.S. 377, 380, citing the St. Paul ordinance). R.A.V. asked that the charges be 
dismissed on the grounds that the ordinance was a content-based speech regulation and thus 
invalid. The Court voted in R.A.V.’s favor, although there was disagreement among the justices 
as to how to justify that holding. 
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The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, reemphasized the principle that content-
based regulations of speech are facially unconstitutional, even when the speech in question falls 
into a category of “proscribable content,” like fighting words (505 U.S. 377, 383). Even 
assuming arguendo the words covered by the St. Paul ordinance were fighting words, the Court 
still found the words received a minimal level of protection under the First Amendment. 
Although it is permissible to prohibit fighting words as a whole category because of their impact, 
the government still may not regulate particular fighting words on the basis of their content. 
Importantly, Greenawalt characterizes this decision as having “blocked the possibility of any 
statute that treats hate speech against groups as special” (1995, 55). 
J. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) 
 This case relates to hate crimes, which are similar to but distinguishable from hate 
speech. Walker defines hate crimes as those crimes in which “the perpetrator is motivated by 
racial or religious hatred for the victim” (1994, 9). State and federal statutes provide for harsher 
penalties when a crime appears to have been motivated by animus on the basis of race, gender 
religion, or similar characteristics. Although seemingly comparable to the St. Paul statute in 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court upheld a Wisconsin statute mandating a heightened penalty 
for crimes motivated by prejudice. 
In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993), several African American men were given 
enhanced sentences for assaulting a white teenager after one of them shouted “There goes a 
white boy; go get him!” Mitchell was punished for his speech, which expressed a particular point 
of view while also inspiring others to commit a crime. As Justice Rehnquist summarized in the 
majority, “Mitchell argues that the Wisconsin penalty-enhancement statute is invalid because it 
punishes the defendant’s discriminatory motive” (508 U.S. 476, 487). But the Court found that 
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Mitchell’s enhanced sentence was permissible because the Wisconsin statute regulated conduct; 
in particular, the state considered his conduct particularly pernicious to society because it was 
based on discrimination, and thus it was appropriate to enhance his sentence.  
K. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)* 
 Barry Black was one of three individuals who were convicted of burning crosses in 
violation of Virginia law. Black led a Ku Klux Klan rally on private property that ended with the 
burning of a large cross. A neighbor reported feeling frightened after hearing the group speak 
disparagingly about African Americans and members of other nonwhite races. Black was 
arrested and found guilty of violating a Virginia law that forbade cross burning for the purpose of 
intimidation.  
 A divided court determined that Black’s conviction was unconstitutional on the grounds 
that the Virginia law went too far in banning cross burning. Justice O’Connor wrote for the 
plurality opinion that the state of Virginia could not assume that intimidation was the intent 
behind every cross burning. The banning of “true threats” was found to be permissible (and this 
category could include some cross burnings), but the banning of all cross burnings 
unconstitutionally included those with a cultural, political, or religious purpose. O’Connor wrote, 
“It may be true that a cross burning, even at a political rally, arouses a sense of anger or hatred 
among the vast majority of citizens who see a burning cross. But this sense of anger or hatred is 
not sufficient to ban all cross burnings” (538 U.S. 343, 366). 
L. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)* 
 The founder of the Westboro Baptist Church, Fred Phelps, along with several members of 
his family, picketed the funeral of a soldier who died in Iraq. Phelps and his family stood on 
public land in accordance with directions from the police and held signs with messages including 
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“Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” and “You’re Going to Hell” (562 U.S. 443, 448). The father of 
the dead soldier sued, claiming the signs inflicted emotional damage.  
 The Court ruled, in an 8-1 decision, that the Westboro Baptist Church’s speech near the 
funeral was strongly protected because its content was of public concern, rather than private. The 
majority, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, found that the speech in question was of public 
concern because it dealt with issues of concern to society at large — namely, whether the United 
States’ policies and morals are dooming the nation. The fact that the church members’ speech 
was upsetting did not mean it lost the strong protection afforded to speech on matters of public 
concern under the First Amendment. 
III. Discussion of the History of Supreme Court Cases Relevant to Hate Speech 
 Rather than a uniform doctrine of free speech, the Supreme Court has crafted a 
patchwork of speech protections that can shift with each new decision. The modern speech cases 
represent a move away from a focus on “the greater good” and toward a focus on individual 
freedom. Terminiello and Brandenburg show some of the “clear and present danger” test’s last 
breaths as the Court began to reject its inherent subjectivity. More recent cases explicitly 
privilege individual freedom above preserving the social order if the means of preserving order 
include prohibiting potentially upsetting speech. 
Importantly for this project, the Court has not offered a precise definition of “hate 
speech.” Although the term is heavily implied in a number of cases, the Court never explicitly 
uses it. A Lexis Nexis search of the term, in fact, returns only four lower court cases that use the 
term in reference to some of the cases surveyed above, including R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Texas 
v. Johnson, Brandenburg v. Ohio, and Virginia v. Black. None of these cases explicitly describe 
hate speech, but lower courts have interpreted them as cases that touch on the subject. 
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 In many ways, these cases do touch on hate speech. The fighting words doctrine, in 
particular, resonates because much hate speech seems likely to provoke a violent response. The 
fighting words doctrine, however, has been narrowed to such a degree that it hardly seems to 
exist as a category of speech. The initial definition in Chaplinsky included words that are “no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas” or have no social value, and “inflict injury” or incite an 
“immediate breach of the peace.” But only a few years later in Terminiello, the Court 
contradicted this precept when it overturned the conviction of a man whose speech whipped up 
two opposing crowds into what can only be described as an “immediate breach of the peace.”  
In Brandenburg, proscribable speech was limited further, this time to speech aimed at 
producing “imminent” illegal action that was likely to occur (395 U.S. 444). Texas v. Johnson 
determined that the term fighting words applied only to speech that provokes or insults an 
individual, not a group. Even then, Shiell writes that “if a reasonable person could ignore or walk 
away from speech or would be moved to violence only later, the expression does not constitute 
fighting words” (1998, 57). Thus, if an individual engages in speech aimed at provoking violence 
that does not actually succeed in provoking violence, the Court seems likely to find that speech 
to be protected. R.A.V. also found that even within the fighting words category, speech may not 
be regulated on the basis of its content. If fighting words express a political view, they can also 
be offered protection (notably, Chaplinsky would suggest that any speech with political value is 
not a form of fighting words). With all these exemptions, it is difficult to imagine a form of 
speech that the current Court would consider fighting words. Strossen argues that the narrowness 
of the category has made it very difficult for prohibitions on hate speech to exist within the 
bounds of the Constitution.  
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IV. The First Wave of Hate Speech Codes on College Campuses 
 As difficult as it may be to prohibit hate speech, many colleges and universities have 
attempted to do so within the confines of the Constitution. But what is hate speech? For all the 
discussion of the term among scholars, a true definition is difficult to find. A number of texts use 
the term without providing any definition, assuming the reader will know what is meant by the 
phrase “hate speech.” For the most part, this assumption is not far off — most people can 
identify speech they consider hateful when they hear it. But the assumption also shows the 
inherent subjectivity of the definition of “hate speech,” which can shift depending on the context, 
the listener, and the location in which the statement took place. To one student, a professor who 
reads a racial slur aloud from a work of literature is merely providing students with a lesson in 
the power of language; to another, the professor has engaged in a hateful form of speech that can 
lead to physical and psychological stress responses. Is the statement hate speech? 
 The literature on hate speech offers little guidance. Walker writes, “There is no 
universally agreed-on definition of hate speech” (1994, 8). Even by the clearest definitions 
provided in scholarly works, hate speech is necessarily subjective. Delgado and Stefancic 
demonstrate the breadth of hate speech when they write, “One can consider hate speech along 
various axes, including direct and indirect, veiled or overt, single or repeated, backed by 
authority and power or not, and accompanied by threat of violence or not” (2004, 11). The 
ambiguity of hate speech and the possibility of its being interpreted differently by different 
people and groups makes it all the more difficult to understand. Walker forwards a simple 
understanding of hate speech: “any form of expression deemed offensive to any racial, religious, 
ethnic, or national group,” a definition that has been expanded to include gender, sexual 
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orientation, ability, and other characteristics in many campus speech codes (1994, 8). This 
definition clearly indicates just how many ways in which the term can be used.  
 Regardless of the term’s precise definition, it is clear that in the 1980s and ’90s, colleges 
all over the United States were facing an increasingly untenable amount of hate speech, perhaps 
in response to the increase in diversity on campuses. At the same time, the need for free 
expression in college was no less necessary than it had been in the past. This time period was 
marked by a noticeable uptick in the number of campus speech codes across the United States. 
Shiell reports that, by 1992, upwards of 300 campuses had adopted speech codes restricting hate 
speech nationwide (1998, 3). With very limited exceptions (California’s Leonard Law, for 
example, grants private college students the same free speech rights as public college students), 
the constitutional questions surrounding speech codes impacted only public schools, as arms of 
the government. Thus, this discussion will focus primarily on controversies at public institutions. 
Colleges are faced with two equally important mandates that can sometimes appear 
contradictory. On one hand, public colleges are required, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to 
provide an equal opportunity for all students to access education. On the other, colleges must 
provide adequate room for the free and open exchange of ideas in the pursuit of knowledge and 
are just as bound to protecting students’ free speech rights under the First Amendment as they 
are to protecting equal opportunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A. The Equal Opportunity Mandate 
At the time speech codes were becoming popular, hate speech against women and 
minorities was reaching a new high on college campuses. In his essay on hate speech regulations, 
Lawrence (1990) points to a lengthy list of examples, including fraternity “jungle parties” at 
which members wore blackface, the distribution of racist leaflets, use of the N-word in 
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vandalism and threatening notes, the creation of white supremacist student groups, and similar 
statements and threats to other minority groups on campuses. One can presume these were only 
the high-profile examples. As Shiell characterized the state of things in 1998, “Go to an 
American college campus and you will see and hear hate speech” (2).  
 Public colleges in the United States are required to provide a learning environment in 
which all students have an equal opportunity to learn. As arms of the government, public 
colleges and universities are obligated, under the Fourteenth Amendment and a number of 
federal statutes, to grant equal educational opportunities to all students, regardless of race or 
gender (Shiell 1998).  Hate speech makes it difficult to provide such an environment; proponents 
of speech codes argue that the simple fact that minorities and females are more likely to bear the 
brunt of hate speech means that they are not being offered an equal opportunity. Shiell writes 
that the harms of hate speech have “led many people to believe that hate speech, at least under 
certain conditions, violates the guarantees of equal protection under the law provided for by the 
Fourteenth Amendment” (1998, 2). Lawrence (1990) and Matsuda (1989) argue that being a 
victim of hate speech can result in emotional trauma and even physical symptoms that make it 
more difficult for some students to participate in academia than others.  
 Matsuda writes that college students are a particularly vulnerable group in need of 
protections from hate speech: “When racist propaganda appears on campus, target-group 
students experience debilitated access to the full university experience” (1989, 2372). That a 
white male student would probably never find himself the victim of such propaganda stacks the 
deck even more in his favor. Hate speech also prevents minorities and women from having an 
equal voice in the “marketplace of ideas” on a college campus by “devaluing” their speech 
(Shiell 1998, 46).  
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Some colleges were faced with threats of legal action from the Fourteenth Amendment 
side of this controversy. After a series of racist incidents on the University of Michigan’s 
campus, the United Coalition Against Racism threatened “to file a class-action civil rights suit 
against the university ‘for not maintaining or creating a non-racist, non-violent atmosphere’ on 
campus” (Shiell 1998, 19). These arguments were compelling to many colleges, and they 
responded by creating speech codes that could limit hate speech on the basis of race, color, 
creed, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and handicap, among other categories. 
B. The Free Expression Mandate 
 While public colleges are required to provide a safe and equal environment for students, 
public schools are also required, under the First Amendment, to allow for the expression of 
protected forms of speech. Critics of speech codes point out that the restriction of speech on 
campuses has a chilling effect that can prevent useful discussion. For instance, in the case of the 
University of Michigan speech code, a student who had not been penalized under the code 
brought a suit against the university — he worried that he would be penalized if he brought up 
controversial ideas about biological differences between the races and the sexes during a class 
(Shiell 1998, 75). 
 In her critique of campus speech codes, Strossen argues that even narrowly drawn speech 
codes can chill speech in the classroom. She writes, “In the recent wave of college crackdowns 
on racist and other forms of hate speech, examples abound of attempts to censor speech 
conveying ideas that clearly play a legitimate role in academic discourse” (Strossen 1990, 528). 
Critics say that codes aimed at preventing hate speech can create a fear of punishment and 
misinterpretation of speech that can lead students to keep quiet during class rather than raise 
potentially offensive topics. Shiell writes that that fear also has the potential to spread to faculty, 
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preemptively halting challenging conversations: “If all speech that intentionally inflicted 
emotional distress were punishable, academia would be in serious trouble” (1998, 59). Shiell 
relates the story of a University of Pennsylvania professor who was censured after “vigorously 
challenging students during a classroom debate of the Thirteenth Amendment” (1998, 59). 
C. Speech Code Cases 
Despite the conflicting mandates of equal protection and free expression, colleges began 
implementing hate speech codes en masse in the 1980s and 90s. As these codes became more 
popular and more students pressed back with legal challenges, schools attempted to wrestle their 
speech codes into the speech protection requirements laid out by the Court. It was a challenge 
that no school successfully met.  The following cases have been highlighted in the literature as 
prominent examples of campus speech codes that fell when challenged in court. 
1. The University of Michigan 
The University of Michigan adopted its speech code in 1988. According to Shiell, the 
code incorporated three tiers of speech; one that exempted the two student newspapers on 
campus, one that covered the public areas of the campus and only regulated violent or destructive 
conduct, and a third that covered the campus’s academic buildings (1998, 19). Generally, the 
speech code forbade language that created a hostile learning environment or inhibited 
participation in academics. The broad speech regulations contained in the code laid the 
groundwork for the first major lawsuit against a university hate speech code: Doe v. University of 
Michigan, 721 F. Supp 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). In an overview of the case, Shiell writes that the 
district court found the speech codes to be both “overbroad (subjected protected speech to 
sanctions) and unduly vague (so ambiguous as to allow officials to arbitrarily enforce the policy 
and violate due process rights)” (1998, 75). Although the University had the right to prohibit 
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some forms of conduct, it could not restrict speech on the grounds that the speech was offensive 
or because the ideas expressed were unsavory. Because it prohibited broad classes of speech that 
included protected speech, the University of Michigan code was deemed overbroad; in its 
application, the policy had impinged on protected speech several times. The speech code was 
also ruled unduly vague, in part because it failed to offer clear guidelines as to what was 
protected speech and what was not. The lack of clarity in the code contributed to a chilling of 
speech on the campus as students came to fear repercussions because they did not know what 
was permitted. The code’s opacity also offered opportunities for administrators to interpret the 
rules in an arbitrary manner. The speech code was thus held unconstitutional. 
 2. The University of Wisconsin 
Although the University of Michigan’s code was deemed unconstitutional, Doe v. 
University of Michigan served to inform other schools as they crafted their own speech codes. 
The University of Wisconsin designed a hate speech code that Shiell calls “superior” to that of 
the University of Michigan. He writes, “…it was both clearer and narrower in scope because it 
specifically excluded comments made in classrooms to the group and required the behavior to 
create a hostile environment” (1998, 78). The Wisconsin speech code was believed to limit only 
fighting words in the sense that words that create a hostile environment are fighting words by 
their nature. But in a challenge brought by the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee’s student 
newspaper, The UWM Post, the Wisconsin speech code was struck down. In UWM Post v. Board 
of Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 774 F. Supp 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991), the district court 
held not only that the speech code was overbroad and vague, much like the Michigan code, but 
that the Wisconsin code went further than just prohibiting fighting words. 
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 The district judge ruled that the definition of fighting words was significantly narrower 
than the interpretation used by the drafters of the Wisconsin code. Shiell writes that the definition 
of fighting words, as used by the judge in this case, required that the words in question be “likely 
to result in a breach of the peace,” “highly likely to result in imminent violence,” and “directed at 
a specific individual in a face-to-face encounter” (1998, 79). Because the district court ruled that 
the creation of a hostile environment does not automatically characterize speech as fighting 
words, the Wisconsin code was found to unconstitutionally prohibit protected speech. 
 3. George Mason University 
In another case, Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University, 
773 F. Supp 792 (E.D. Va. 1991), the district court for Eastern Virginia ruled against a college 
once more, this time specifically holding that the university could not prohibit “expressive 
messages that offend merely because the administration or some other students disapprove of the 
message” (Shiell 1998, 81). Shiell writes that the district court also rejected a Fourteenth 
Amendment defense that the school needed the speech code to provide equal educational 
opportunities to students of all races and genders. In this instance, a fraternity brought the case 
after being censured for hosting a performance in which one student wore blackface. The district 
judge determined that because the performances did not “substantially or materially disrupt these 
aspects of GMU’s educational mission,” the college’s Fourteenth Amendment argument was not 
relevant enough to justify a speech restriction (Shiell 1998, 82).  
 4. Stanford University 
 In 1995, Stanford University also faced a lawsuit over its attempt to limit hate speech. 
Although a private institution, Stanford fell under the jurisdiction of a California law that forbade 
even private colleges from disciplining students on the basis of their speech or expressive 
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conduct (Shiell 1998, 89). The Stanford policy attempted to regulate what it referred to as 
“Discriminatory Harassment” and defined prohibited speech as that which insulted on the basis 
of “sex, race, color, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or national and ethnic origin” and was 
directed at an individual or group with the intention of insulting them (Lawrence 1990, 450, 
citing the Stanford policy). 
 The policy was carefully crafted to ensure it covered only fighting words. Lawrence 
points out that it did little more than “prohibit intentional face-to-face insults, a form of speech 
that is unprotected by the First Amendment” (1990, 451). Nevertheless, five years after 
Lawrence’s article on the policy’s constitutionality, it was struck down in Corry v. Stanford 
University, No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995) due to overbreadth and the fact that the 
law regulated speech on the basis of its content.  
V. Discussion of Hate Speech Codes on College Campuses 
Campus speech code cases seem to point out a glaring flaw in the current iteration of the 
fighting words doctrine: unless physical violence actually arises from speech, or is imminent as a 
result of speech, that speech will likely not be deemed fighting words. This essentially means 
that any speech, if heard by a coolheaded person who is unlikely to resort to violence, could be 
freed of the fighting words doctrine and considered protected. Even deeply offensive words can 
be protected if the listener does not respond with violence; although the Court has made use of 
the “reasonable person” standard to determine whether words have the potential to incite 
violence, it has also seemingly contradicted that standard by using the presence or absence of 
violence to determine whether speech could be deemed fighting words in cases like Cohen v. 
California and U.S. v. O’Brien. 
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As Lawrence argues, this is problematic in the realm of hate speech. “The fighting words 
doctrine presupposes an encounter between two persons of relatively equal power who have been 
acculturated to respond to face-to-face insults with violence,” he writes. Although his view of 
fighting words doesn’t quite align with the facts of Chaplinsky, in which there was a power 
imbalance between the police officer and Chaplinsky himself, it does acknowledge the fact that 
some members of minority groups are less likely to respond to fighting words from, for instance, 
a white male, due to power differences between the two. It’s this difference in power that 
Lawrence is referring to when he writes,  “The fighting words doctrine is a paradigm based on a 
white male point of view. In most situations, minorities correctly perceive that a violent response 
to fighting words will result in a risk to their own life and limb” (Lawrence 1990, 454). 
Lawrence asks for a new understanding of fighting words that takes into account the harms of 
racist hate speech without requiring a violent response. 
 Does the fighting words doctrine provide enough protection for minorities — or for 
anyone — when it mandates that actual violence be used in response to offensive speech? To 
proponents of campus speech codes, the answer is an obvious no. The fighting words doctrine 
has not provided enough space to make campus speech codes constitutional in the eyes of the 
courts, even when those codes are expressly aimed at only limiting fighting words. Further, the 
R.A.V. standard makes any code that distinguishes between types of fighting words 
unconstitutional. The alternative would be to create a speech code that limits all fighting words, 
but this approach presents the additional problem of predicting what may cause violence and 
limiting speech based upon the “heckler’s veto.” 
 Particularly in light of the power dynamics pointed out by Lawrence, the gaps in the 
fighting words doctrine present a question: should the courts take a different approach to speech, 
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one that protects those in marginalized groups who are unwilling or unable to literally “fight” in 
response to fighting words? Matsuda, for instance, proposes a new judicial approach to hate 
speech that allows for some content-based limitations of especially invidious speech. She writes, 
“setting aside the worst forms of racist speech for special treatment is a non-neutral, value-laden 
approach that will better preserve free speech” (Matsuda 1989, 2357). 
 Opponents of campus speech codes would argue such a loophole leaves open the 
possibility of even more speech restrictions that could be used to silence minority groups. 
Strossen describes this as a major stumbling point. “Such rules constitute a precedent that can be 
used to restrict other types of speech,” she writes (Strossen 1990, 521). The chilling effect of 
speech codes could also lead to self-censorship, she writes, thus restricting protected speech 
without ever having to bring judicial charges. One of the key differences between Strossen’s 
argument and those of Lawrence and Matsuda, though, is that Strossen relies upon existing 
Supreme Court jurisprudence to justify her points and ultimately decide that campus speech 
codes are an intolerable violation of free speech. Because she has the law on her side, Strossen 
can safely argue that proponents of campus speech codes do not have a constitutional leg to stand 
on and base that argument in case law. She may call upon R.A.V. and seemingly prove that a 
content-based regulation of speech is utterly unacceptable. 
Lawrence and Matsuda, however, must argue outside existing free speech doctrines as 
defined by the Court. Both explore possible new judicial approaches to hate speech that have yet 
to be recognized (or have been actively denied by the Court): for Lawrence, it is a fighting words 
doctrine that doesn’t require imminent violence, and for Matsuda, it is a way of thinking about 
the First Amendment that allows for the regulation of particularly pernicious racial hate speech. 
Neither argument has the full backing of First Amendment jurisprudence (although Lawrence’s 
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is at least derived from the fighting words doctrine). Both use a different understanding of what 
the goals of the First Amendment should be than Strossen uses. Strossen believes the First 
Amendment should defend all speech equally, and that repellent ideas will eventually be 
defeated through open debate. Lawrence and Matsuda instead prioritize limiting some speech in 
the hopes that doing so will encourage more voices — namely, those of traditionally oppressed 
groups — to enter into the fray in a way they currently cannot because of the ongoing harms of 
hate speech.  
These two approaches, one that emphasizes individual freedoms and one that emphasizes 
the need to prevent harm and uphold a “higher standard,” represent a larger debate over what the 
First Amendment should protect. It is to this debate that I now turn.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORIES AND METHODOLOGY 
I. Theories 
While the complexity of the hate-speech debate cannot be reduced to two competing 
perspectives, I will limit my discussion to two broad frameworks, liberalism and 
communitarianism, for the sake of clarity. My preliminary analysis of hate speech suggests that 
the debate is dominated by these two major ways of thinking on the issue; these two perspectives 
also seem to capture the opposing mandates colleges must meet. Put simply, the two sides 
disagree about the extent to which speech may be regulated and the reasons for regulating it. 
Liberalism and communitarianism are broad and diverse schools of thought, but for the purposes 
of this project, I will only investigate their implications in terms of speech’s value and role and 
their takes on the issue of hate speech. 
A. The Liberal Model of Free Speech 
 Although what I am calling the liberal model goes by many names in the literature, 4 it is 
possible to identify consistent traits frequently attributed to the term as it relates to free speech. 
Sandel writes that liberalism posits “the idea that government should be neutral among 
competing conceptions of the good life” (2005, 212). In other words, the immense power of the 
state must be restricted from choosing sides in social debates. Sandel describes this principle as 
“the claim that the right is prior to the good”: in speech terms, this is the idea that the right to free 
speech must be prioritized over the necessity of establishing or protecting a given conception of 
“the good” in society (2005, 212). In a diverse democratic society, where conceptions of the 
good will not be easily agreed upon, it is more important that each individual be able to express 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Sandel uses the term “political liberalism,” while Smolla refers to libertarianism, a subset of liberalism, in his 
discussion of hate speech. Schauer uses the term “argument from truth” as a stand-in for liberalism in his 
“philosophical enquiry” into free speech. 
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his or her ideas about the good than it is that any one idea be endorsed and defended by the 
government. 
Schauer (1982) refers to the “marketplace of ideas” as another key tenet of liberalism — 
the suggestion that truth can only be found in an open arena, where all ideas can be expressed 
and considered. “Just as Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ will ensure that the best products emerge 
from free competition, so too will an invisible hand ensure that the best ideas emerge when all 
opinions are permitted freely to compete,” Schauer writes (1982, 16). A government that 
regulates which ideas may be expressed could very well be clouding the truth in favor of a false 
view. Liberalism suggests this is impermissible. An open marketplace is necessary to the 
functioning of a free society. 
 In “Liberalism: The Life of an Idea,” Fawcett refers to this aspect of liberalism as the 
principle of nonintrusion, or the idea that each person has a sphere of inviolable personal liberties 
with which the government may not interfere (2014, 121). Speech, or the ability to publicly 
express views, is included in this sphere. Smolla specifically delineates the areas in which the 
government has authority to regulate according to liberalism’s precepts. He writes, “[T]he 
legitimate jurisdiction of government only extends so far as is necessary to keep one citizen from 
harming another” (1990, 174). Smolla adds that under the liberal tradition, “Law exists to keep 
minimal order, to provide for the common defense, to insure domestic tranquility” (1990, 74). 
Thus, the law may regulate speech in limited ways, but may only do so in ways that are 
necessary to ensure the continued existence of the state and the safety of individuals. Liberalism 
emphasizes the importance of individual decision making and responsibility — the notion that 
individuals must be able to choose what speech they engage in, regardless of how offensive it 
might be, to ensure that all are heard in the marketplace of ideas. 
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Regulating hate speech is not considered one of these permissible spheres of government 
regulation in most, if not all, conceptions of liberalism. Smolla writes, “[R]aising the level of 
public discourse or improving sensitivity to communal values is beyond the ken of the state” 
(1990, 174). To regulate hate speech would be to take sides in a social debate, no matter how 
repellent one side may seem. From this liberal perspective, it is unacceptable for the government 
to endorse “anti-racist” or “anti-sexist” views, even if such an endorsement might seem to have a 
positive impact on society by limiting the spread of discriminatory ideas. The value of the speech 
being regulated is immaterial, Smolla writes: “The libertarian is forced to defend racists and 
sexists on the pure market principle that the lack of any discernible redeeming value does not 
matter” (1990, 175). Further, the fact that racist or sexist (or otherwise hateful speech) causes 
offense or emotional pain is not considered a valid reason to regulate it under a liberal doctrine. 
“Some injury more palpable than moral outrage is required,” Smolla writes (1990, 175). So long 
as no physical injury is provoked by hate speech (in a fighting words scenario, for instance), it is 
not considered within the government’s jurisdiction. Sandel writes, “The liberal would therefore 
oppose restrictions on hate speech, except where it is likely to provoke some actual physical 
harm — some harm independent of the speech itself” (2005, 258).  
Thus, in terms of speech, the liberal view is fairly consistent: speech may not be 
regulated merely because it insults. Government intrusion in the “marketplace of ideas” is 
impermissible except under the direst circumstances, such as a threat to national security, 
because it hinders the ability of the market to unearth truth. To a proponent of hate speech bans, 
the liberal would respond that all ideas must be heard, but that the truth would win out in the 
long run — in fact, the best way to defeat hate speech is to respond with opposing ideas and let 
them slowly overtake hateful ideas in the marketplace. A preference for individual liberties and 
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for permitting speech in nearly all circumstances will be used as key identifying features of the 
liberal model throughout this project. Because the liberal conception of speech emphasizes the 
importance of speech in determining truth and in sifting through the plurality of ideas in any 
society, I will also consider these and related ideas to be evidence of a liberal perspective. 
B. The Communitarian Model of Free Speech 
 The communitarian model of free speech favors a more values-based approach to speech 
regulation. Smolla writes of the communitarian viewpoint, “[L]aw exists to make men good by 
binding them together in a cohesive and just community” (1990, 173). This assertion might not 
describe the views of every communitarian, but in a general sense, it articulates 
communitarianism’s concern with liberalism: that it does not offer enough protection for shared 
communal values. The communitarian believes, according to Sandel, that “our deliberations 
about justice and rights cannot proceed without reference to the conceptions of the good that find 
expression in the many cultures and traditions within which those deliberations take place” 
(2005, 213). In other words, persons cannot be seen solely as individuals, but as members of 
groups with responsibilities and loyalties to those groups. Rights are not “prior to the good,” as a 
liberal might posit, but rather follow from agreed-upon standards of morality and civility. Smolla 
writes that under a communitarian doctrine, “speech that promotes the good life and that affirms 
values of community, justice, and the rule of law will be fostered and nurtured by the state; 
speech destructive of those ends will be condemned” (1990, 173). 
 Communitarianism developed as a critique of liberalism’s emphasis on individual rights 
(to the detriment of community) and in defense of the community as a source of rights. Whipps 
writes, “While liberalism elevates one’s personal choices and personal responsibilities, 
communitarianism highlights each person’s responsibility to the communal welfare, a type of 
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social commitment often missing from liberalism” (2009, 118). Unlike liberalism, 
communitarianism leaves room for individuals to have one or more communal identities, perhaps 
based upon personal identity, geography, or other unifying characteristics, and to base their 
system of rights upon those identities. Sandel argues that in deciding what speech is deserving of 
protection, a communitarian would consider “the moral importance of the speech in relation to 
the moral status of the settled identities the speech would disrupt or offend” (2005, 258). To be 
sure, not every community places a premium upon shared identity at the expense of some 
speech, but the communitarian perspective suggests that communities can define their values 
based upon group identity, and can place less priority on some rights, such as speech.  
According to the communitarian model, hate speech based upon a group characteristic 
such as race or sex may have less value than the community value of inclusion and tolerance, and 
thus could be regulated. Put differently, the communitarian perspective might, under some 
conditions, allow for the silencing of a small group engaging in hate speech to protect these 
values of the larger community. A communitarian understanding of free speech allows for 
subjectivity in the sense that the government may try to defend the values that define the 
community based upon “substantive moral judgment,” as Sandel puts it (2005, 260).  
The case of National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie offers an example 
where communitarians and liberals would be likely to disagree in their interpretation of how and 
whether speech should be regulated. Although the village of Skokie had a substantial population 
of Holocaust survivors, according to Philippa Strum’s 1999 book on the case, a local branch of a 
U.S. variety of Nazism was ultimately allowed to march through town (the party ended up 
canceling the march). A communitarian would argue that the community’s fear of Nazism and 
their identity as Jewish survivors of the Holocaust should, perhaps, outweigh the value of the 
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National Socialist Party’s hateful and intimidating message. This demonstrates the 
communitarian view that some communal values should be morally prior to speech. Although 
not all adherents of the communitarian model would agree to this outcome, all would agree that 
individual free speech must be weighed in the context of the good of the community. For the 
purposes of this project, communitarian assumptions regarding free speech will be identified 
based upon references to community values and morals for the justification of speech 
regulations. 
II. Application of Theories to Hate-Speech Debate 
The liberal and communitarian models are useful theoretical lenses through which to 
approach the contemporary hate-speech debate for several reasons. First, the divide between 
liberalism and communitarianism captures the core philosophical differences between two major 
sides in the hate-speech debate. As discussed in the previous chapter, some civil libertarians, like 
Strossen (1990), believe that the best way to combat hate speech is to fight it with words. The 
message of tolerance can only spread and win out if it is heard, and prohibiting speech impedes 
that goal.  
Alternatively, those in favor of hate speech restrictions, like Lawrence (1990) and 
Matsuda (1989), argue that communal values of equality should outweigh an individual's right to 
engage in hate speech on the basis of group characteristics. On college campuses, the argument 
goes, the right to express hateful views should not outweigh the right of minority and female 
students to enjoy a learning environment that is as safe for them as it is for their white, male 
peers and to maintain their place in the educational community. The liberal-communitarian 
contrast helps us understand the different assumptions being employed on the two sides of the 
hate speech debate both among scholars and in the legal system. 
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The liberal and communitarian models also parallel the opposing mandates faced by 
public colleges and universities: colleges must protect students' First Amendment rights and their 
ability to engage freely in protected forms of speech, but they must also defend students' 
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, which mandates that students be protected 
from discrimination in higher education. These mandates are striking in their similarity to the 
principles of liberalism and communitarianism. The First Amendment mandate highlights the 
importance of civil liberties and free expression, while the Fourteenth Amendment mandate 
emphasizes equality as an important value — a value that seeks to repair the damage of large-
scale and ongoing racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression. 
Because liberal and communitarian values are so steeped in the hate-speech controversy, 
they provide important theoretical frameworks for this project. Using these two competing 
conceptions of the value and role of free speech, I will identify the theoretical assumptions and 
arguments underlying judges’ opinions in campus hate speech cases. 
III. Approach to Judicial Case Analysis 
To determine which theoretical framework has been most favored by the judiciary, I will 
perform a qualitative content analysis of a number of cases, including several of the key free 
speech cases identified in Chapter One and several cases from the first wave of litigation over 
campus speech codes. The goal of this analysis is to determine whether the judiciary’s 
deliberations (as presented in their opinions) on free speech, and hate speech specifically, contain 
assumptions and principles that fit liberalism, communitarianism, or other theoretical 
assumptions. The first set of cases, those from the free speech cases listed in Section II of 
Chapter One, have been chosen for deeper analysis based upon their relevance to the hate speech 
question and the likelihood, based upon their deliberations and holdings, that they articulate 
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some of the fundamental principles underlying the Court’s rulings on free speech. The campus 
speech code cases have been chosen based upon Shiell’s “Campus Hate Speech on Trial,” which 
offers an overview of the most important cases from the first wave of speech codes. 
My analysis of each case will include majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions to 
ensure that I capture both the “winning” logic and the “losing” logic. This will allow me to 
ascertain patterns in what types of reasoning the courts have considered, accepted and dismissed. 
In my analysis, I will review each case and attempt to identify the primary logic of the decision 
and whether it conforms to the frameworks of liberalism, communitarianism, or alternative 
assumptions I have not identified. I will also include an analysis of the overall holding of each 
case and which theoretical framework it seems to support. 
In the entire endeavor, I will seek to be as transparent as possible as I identify case logic 
and the frameworks used by the Court. I will combat any potential for subjectivity in qualitative 
analysis by giving plentiful context for the case logic and explanation as to why I believe the 
logic demonstrates a liberal, communitarian, or other conception of free speech. In spite of the 
limitations of such an analysis, I have elected to perform a qualitative analysis over a quantitative 
one because qualitative analysis offers greater subtlety and nuance. The theoretical assumptions 
used in judicial opinions can be better identified through qualitative means. Rather than 
attempting to quantify statements within these opinions, I will take a more holistic approach. In 
his discussion of qualitative content analysis, Siegfried Kracauer writes that while qualitative 
analyses are inherently somewhat subjective, they also uncover “the patterns, the wholes, which 
can be made manifest by qualitative exegesis and which can throw light upon a textual 
characteristic which is allergic to quantitative breakdowns” (1953, 640). Hall and Wright also 
endorse a more qualitative approach to analyzing judicial opinions, writing that this approach can 
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be useful for “descriptive or explanatory studies” (2008, 90). “The approach is loosely 
structured, calling on the researcher simply to observe and document what can be found,” they 
write (Hall & Wright 2008, 90). Likewise, my project will rely upon observance and 
documentation to identify patterns through qualitative means. 
IV. Case Selection 
 I will analyze six speech cases from those listed in Section II of Chapter One. I have 
selected each because they are major cases in free speech jurisprudence and because they contain 
some of the most important expressions of the Court’s free speech doctrines as they relate to hate 
speech. I will analyze Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire and Terminiello v. Chicago for their 
contributions to the fighting words doctrine, which plays a major role in recent cases relating to 
campus speech codes. I will also examine National Socialist Party of America v. Village of 
Skokie and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul because they deal with the tension between community 
values and individual rights and demonstrate how the Court has balanced these competing 
interests. R.A.V. is also the primary case relating to hate speech that the Supreme Court has 
decided, as it deals with expression motivated by racial hatred. Similarly, Virginia v. Black 
illustrates the Court’s thinking on the difference between expressive conduct and speech, and 
how that difference plays into the hate speech debate. Finally, I will analyze Snyder v. Phelps, 
one of the most recent cases dealing with the restriction of unpleasant speech. This case should 
offer insight into the Court’s attempts to balance individual rights to expressive speech against 
the social interests in restricting certain types of speech. Snyder v. Phelps is important because it 
is so recent, and will thus offer an idea of the Court’s contemporary views on speech and speech 
restrictions. 
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 In addition to these background cases, I will analyze several campus speech code cases 
from the first wave of speech codes. Like in my analysis of Supreme Court cases, I will identify 
the primary logic of the decision and interpret whether it utilizes a liberal, communitarian, or 
other framework. I will use the cases laid out by Shiell in his chapter on campus hate speech 
cases, as they have been identified as key cases in this genre.  
The first set of cases I analyze will establish the Court’s reasoning regarding the value 
and limits of free speech, as well as whether that reasoning displays a preference for liberal, 
communitarian, or other values, while the second set will establish how that preference has 
played out in campus speech code cases and the implications for colleges and universities. An 
understanding of both sets of cases and the theoretical frameworks used therein will act as a 
foundation for my later chapters, in which I will consider whether the Court should utilize a 
different framework or conception of free speech as it moves forward into the “second wave” of 
campus speech codes.  
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CHAPTER THREE: JUDICIAL CASE ANALYSIS 
 
I.  Supreme Court Cases 
 
A. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) 
 
1. Background 
 In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), a Jehovah’s Witness named 
Walter Chaplinsky was convicted of violating New Hampshire law after describing a police 
officer using strong derogatory terms. The law in question read: “No person shall address any 
offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other 
public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name…” (315 U.S. 568, 569). After 
Chaplinsky provoked an unruly crowd by referring to all religion as a “racket” while he 
attempted to distribute leaflets on the Jehovah’s Witnesses, he was given warnings and 
eventually arrested by police, at which point he declared one officer “a damned Fascist” and “a 
God damned racketeer” (315 U.S. 568, 569). Chaplinsky was found guilty of violating the New 
Hampshire law at trial, a finding that he appealed on the grounds that it violated several 
constitutional rights, including free speech. 
2. Unanimous Opinion 
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld Chaplinsky’s conviction on the grounds that his 
words were “epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a 
breach of the peace” (315 U.S. 568, 574). The opinion, authored by Justice Murphy, articulated 
the definition of fighting words as: 
Those [words] which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality. (315 U.S. 568, 572) 
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The Court found that the terms Chaplinsky used to describe the police officer were likely to stir 
violence in an average person and cause a breach of the peace. Thus, because these words are 
deemed to have almost no social value, they may be regulated under the First Amendment. 
Murphy wrote, “it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and 
under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional 
problem” (315 U.S. 568, 571–572). 
 In the specific case of the New Hampshire law, Murphy quoted the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court’s test of what terms may be considered offensive: “The word ‘offensive’ is not to 
be defined in terms of what a particular addressee thinks. … The test is what men of common 
intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight” 
(315 U.S. 568, 573). 
From the Court’s decision, several meanings of fighting words can be discerned. Words 
that “inflict injury” or “incite an immediate breach of the peace” are found to be “no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas” and to be lacking in social benefits that could outweigh the 
government’s interest in regulating them. Further, the term is taken to mean any speech that 
“men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average 
addressee to fight” (315 U.S. 568, 573). Implicit in the Court’s definitions is the idea that some 
speech is so base as to be undeserving of significant First Amendment protection — a contrast to 
the liberal principle of the marketplace of ideas, in which “offensive” speech must be defeated 
through argument rather than through government intervention. 
Among the cases being investigated here, Chaplinsky provides perhaps the best example 
of the Court’s use of logic that fits neatly with communitarian values. Murphy wrote explicitly 
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that any interest in protecting fighting words does not outweigh the government’s “social interest 
in order and morality” (315 U.S. 568, 572). The idea that the government may limit speech in 
furtherance of a state interest in morality suggests that Murphy employed principles with which a 
communitarian would be likely to agree. As Rodney Smolla writes of communitarianism, 
“speech that promotes the good life and that affirms values of community, justice, and the rule of 
law will be fostered and nurtured by the state; speech destructive of those ends will be 
condemned” (1990, 173). Chaplinsky is a clear example of the Court using its authority to 
condemn speech it deems destructive of the community and the rule of law. That this decision 
was a unanimous one suggests that, at least in 1942, the Court was supportive of logic that was 
quite similar to communitarian values that allow for government intervention against “harmful” 
speech like fighting words. 
B. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) 
1. Background 
 In Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), Arthur Terminiello, a former priest, was 
charged with and found guilty of disturbing the peace in violation of a Chicago ordinance after 
giving a speech that incited an angry crowd of protesters to riot. Although police were present, 
they were unable to contain the crowd outside the theater where Terminiello was speaking. 
Terminiello’s speech specifically targeted some of the religious, political, and racial groups that 
made up the group of protesters outside the theater, provoking outrage among the crowd. The 
lower court in this case ruled that the Chicago ordinance, which forbade “misbehavior [that] may 
constitute a breach of the peace if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a 
condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance,” regulated solely fighting words and was thus 
permissible (337 U.S. 1, 2). 
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2. Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court voted 5-4 to overturn Terminiello’s conviction; however, the Court 
declined to decide whether Terminiello’s speech could be deemed fighting words and instead 
determined the ordinance violated the First Amendment on other grounds. Justices Vinson, 
Frankfurter, and Jackson authored dissenting opinions. Justice Douglas, who authored the 
majority opinion, emphasized that the most important role of speech in a democracy is to 
maintain government responsiveness and free discussion of ideas. “The right to speak freely and 
to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us 
apart from totalitarian regimes” (337 U.S. 1, 4). Douglas wrote that while speech is not an 
absolute freedom, Terminiello’s speech (like all speech that challenges the status quo) was 
uncomfortable but constitutionally permissible. Unless the speech demonstrated a clear and 
present danger beyond creating a disturbance, it could not be regulated.  
Douglas wrote, “There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For 
the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant 
political or community groups” (337 U.S. 1, 4–5). As a result, the Court found that the Chicago 
statute was unconstitutional because it allowed for the audience’s response to determine the 
legality of speech — in other words, the ordinance granted a “heckler’s veto” that would make 
speech illegal if the audience took issue with the content of the message and responded by 
creating a disturbance. To allow a heckler’s veto would stifle the very purpose of free speech, 
which is to invite dissent and discussion of controversial speech.  
Douglas’ majority demonstrated a preference for individual rights over the need for social 
order, in seeming dissonance with the decision in Chaplinsky, which was announced only seven 
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years before Terminiello. This decision shows the Court is also open to logic that fits more 
closely with liberal thinking. 
3. Vinson’s Dissent 
 Chief Justice Vinson’s dissenting opinion is based upon the procedural history of the 
case, rather than the substantive First Amendment issue, and thus does not offer any logic that is 
relevant to my analysis. To Vinson, the fact that that Terminiello’s lawyers never objected to the 
constitutionality of the Chicago statute during jury instruction in the initial trial was dispositive 
in determining that there was no basis for an appeal. 
4. Frankfurter’s Dissent 
 Justice Frankfurter’s dissent also focuses on the case’s procedural history, albeit in 
greater detail than Chief Justice Vinson’s. Frankfurter wrote that while the First Amendment 
protects individuals’ right to challenge the status quo, that Terminiello’s speech was of such a 
vile nature (and his complaint over a fine of only $100) that his case was not worth violating 
traditional rules of standing that would normally prevent the Court from stepping in given the 
circumstances discussed in the Vinson’s dissenting opinion. 
5. Jackson’s Dissent 
In dissent, Justice Jackson took issue with the Court’s findings, arguing the majority gave 
too little deference to the need to protect the public order. Quoting extensively from 
Terminiello’s speech, Jackson (joined by Justice Burton) argued that Terminiello actively sought 
to provoke violence between two opposed groups — his audience and a crowd of protesters 
outside the theater. Jackson wrote:  
Behind Terminiello and his hundred-dollar fine lurk some of the most far-reaching 
constitutional questions that can confront a people who value both liberty and order. This 
Court seems to regard these as enemies of each other and to be of the view that we must 
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forego order to achieve liberty. So it fixes its eyes on a conception of freedom of speech 
so rigid as to tolerate no concession to society’s need for public order. (337 U.S. 1, 14) 
 
Jackson emphasized the fact that Terminiello’s speech, quite literally, caused a riot: that his 
speech was not an abstract discussion of ideas but a targeted message with the intention of 
causing a breach of the peace. Jackson also pointed out that the majority’s ruling prevented cities 
across America from instituting ordinances similar to Chicago’s, which he saw as problematic 
because of the rash of hostile interactions between quasi-fascist and -communist groups 
occurring frequently at the time of the Court’s decision. Because, as Jackson put it, totalitarian 
groups wished to undermine democratic government, the government should have the power to 
prevent violent outbursts by those groups, even if it meant limiting speech in small ways.  
Jackson accused the majority of abandoning the precedents set forth in Schenk v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), which allowed for the regulation of speech that presented a clear and 
present danger, and Chaplinsky’s fighting words doctrine. That a crowd was incited to violence 
as a result of Terminiello’s speech demonstrated a clear and present danger, according to 
Jackson. Jackson also contended that Terminiello’s speech was an obvious example of fighting 
words because it provoked or was likely to provoke a violent response, similar to the terms used 
in Chaplinsky. Jackson argued that a government that cannot provide order cannot protect 
speech, and as such the ability to punish those who disrupt order is a crucial power of the 
government. “Freedom of speech exists only under law and not independently of it,” Jackson 
wrote (337 U.S. 31). He describes the result of the majority opinion as “a dogma of absolute 
freedom for irresponsible and provocative utterance which almost completely sterilizes the 
power of local authorities to keep the peace as against this kind of tactics” (337 U.S. 1, 28). 
Jackson added: “In considering abuse of freedom by provocative utterances it is 
necessary to observe that the law is more tolerant of discussion than are most individuals or 
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communities” (337 U.S. 1, 32). This statement suggests that, while the American legal system is 
open to free debate and discussion in an abstract sense, some speech is simply not accepted in 
American communities. As such, Jackson argued, those who choose to engage in highly 
controversial speech must at some point be held responsible when their listeners react with 
violence.  
Jackson’s dissent called upon the notion that an individual’s right to free speech is 
secondary to the social order because the right to free speech cannot exist without social order. 
He also emphasized that, while the law cannot permit a “heckler’s veto,” the reality of American 
society is that some speech will not be tolerated or responded to peacefully. This notion is 
similar the communitarian idea that communities can select and enforce their own social values. 
Like Chaplinsky, Jackson’s dissent offers a mode of considering free speech that echoes 
communitarianism; however, in this case, these similarities are found in a dissent, rather than a 
majority opinion, suggesting the Court shifted its primary manner of considering free speech 
after Chaplinsky. 
C. National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) 
1. Background 
 The case of National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977) 
originated when the local government of Skokie, Illinois blocked the National Socialist Party of 
America from marching in the village. According to Philippa Strum’s retelling of “the Skokie 
Affair,” the party was a U.S. variety of Nazism that maintained the view that Jewish and 
African-American persons were “biologically inferior” (1999, 1). The leader of the party, Frank 
Collin, claimed the group wished to establish an all-white nation (Strum 1999, 14). Because 
Skokie had a sizable population of Jewish survivors of the Holocaust, the National Socialist 
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Party’s messages were considered especially vile. The party was blocked from marching via an 
injunction from the Circuit Court of Cook County. Skokie officials argued “Any display of the 
swastika in Skokie would be so severe a ‘symbolic assault’ on the hundreds of Holocaust 
survivors … that it would constitute an ‘incitation to violence and retaliation’” (Strum 1999, 25). 
The injunction forbade the following: 
[M]arching, walking or parading in the uniform of the National Socialist Party of 
America; [m]arching, walking or parading or otherwise displaying the swastika on or off 
their person; [d]istributing pamphlets or displaying any materials which incite or promote 
hatred against persons of Jewish faith or ancestry or hatred against persons of any faith or 
ancestry, race or religion. (432 U.S. 43, 43, citing the injunction) 
 
2. Per Curiam Opinion 
The contention that the march would be the equivalent of a physical attack on the people 
of Skokie did not convince the Supreme Court, which issued a short per curiam opinion 
reversing the injunction. Justice Rehnquist authored a dissenting opinion. The Court found that 
the injunction denied the National Socialist Party’s First Amendment rights because they would 
not be able to march during the appeals process. The Court remanded the case to the Illinois 
Appellate Court, which reversed the injunction with the exception of the swastika. The Illinois 
Supreme Court followed this decision with the finding that even the swastika was a protected 
form of symbolic speech (Strum 1999). The Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal by the city 
of Skokie, effectively upholding the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court and allowing the 
National Socialist Party to march (Strum 1999). Two years after the U.S. Supreme Court initially 
protected the party’s right to march, Frank Collin announced the group would not march in 
Skokie (Strum 1999). 
 In Skokie, the Court demonstrated a strong affinity for individual rights over community 
values and standards. In spite of enormous public disapproval for Frank Collin and the National 
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Socialist Party, which Strum describes as a relatively small group that was never able to get even 
200 people to its rallies, the Court found in the group’s favor (1999, 5). The community of 
Skokie had deeply held values that would not have allowed for the National Socialist Party to 
express its views, but the Court offered little sympathy for these values. Rather, it chose to 
protect the individual rights of the party’s members over the community’s wishes in an 
unpopular decision that aligns closely with liberal ideology (Strum 1999). 
3. Rehnquist’s Dissent 
 Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, filed a dissenting 
opinion. While Rehnquist did not disagree with the per curiam decision’s findings with regards 
to the First Amendment issue, he contended that the Court has overstepped its constitutional 
bounds in accepting the case in the first place. As such, his dissenting opinion does not offer 
logic worthy of analysis in this project. 
D. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) 
1. Background 
 After several teenagers fashioned a cross and burned it on the lawn of a black family in 
St. Paul, Minnesota, the city charged them with violating an ordinance that forbade certain 
actions that were likely to “arouse anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, 
color, creed, religion or gender,” including burning a cross or swastika. The teenagers sued on 
the grounds that the ordinance violated their First Amendment rights. A trial court found that it 
did, but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed this finding, ruling that the ordinance passed the 
strict scrutiny test requiring the law be a narrowly tailored means of achieving a compelling 
government interest. 
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2. Majority Opinion 
In a unanimous decision but with split logic, the Supreme Court overturned the St. Paul 
ordinance. A majority held that the ordinance was facially unconstitutional because it prohibited 
speech on the basis of content. Justices White and Blackmun authored concurring opinions. 
Although the majority did not decide whether the ordinance regulated fighting words, it found 
(assuming arguendo that the ordinance did regulate fighting words) that it was unconstitutional 
to regulate only some fighting words based upon their content and audience. Because the statute 
limited fighting words that were based upon the race or gender of the victim, but not fighting 
words that were based upon other characteristics, like political affiliation, the government was 
expressing a preference for some forms of speech over others. Justice Scalia, who authored the 
majority, explained this concept colorfully: “St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of 
a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensbury rules” (505 
U.S. 377, 392).  
The government cannot express a particular distaste for some fighting words and not 
others, the Court found. As Scalia put it in the majority opinion, categories of regulatable 
expression are not “categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may 
be made vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content” 
(505 U.S. 377, 383–384). Such a categorization would allow for the government to regulate only 
libel that criticizes the government, for instance, in a clear violation of the First Amendment (505 
U.S. 377, 384). Quoting Chaplinsky, Scalia emphasized that the Court had found that fighting 
words are not “‘no part of the expression of ideas,’” but rather that they are “‘no essential part of 
any exposition of ideas’” (505 U.S. 377, 384). Scalia used this seemingly small distinction to 
show that even fighting words can be worthy of some aspects of First Amendment protection. 
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The government may not regulate even fighting words on the basis of their content, even while it 
can enact neutral regulations of such words as an entire category. 
Scalia wrote, “One must wholeheartedly agree with the Minnesota Supreme Court that ‘it 
is the responsibility, even the obligation, of diverse communities to confront such notions in 
whatever form they appear,’ but the manner of that confrontation cannot consist of selective 
limitations upon speech” (505 U.S. 377, 392). He also dismissed the idea that the “injury” caused 
by some hateful speech (namely, speech motivated by hatred on the basis of race, religion, 
gender, or creed) is “qualitatively different” than the harm of other hateful speech, as well as the 
idea that the hurtful impact of speech upon a listener is an adequate reason to limit speech (505 
U.S. 377, 392). Scalia even went so far as to acknowledge that the state has compelling interests 
in preserving the human rights of those who are members of marginalized groups by protecting 
them from hateful speech on the basis of their status as members of those groups, but still 
concluded that the state could meet those interests through content-neutral methods that do not 
demonstrate a preference for some views over others. Scalia concluded: “Let there be no mistake 
about our belief that burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has 
sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to 
the fire” (505 U.S. 377, 396). In other words, St. Paul could have used other measures and laws 
(trespassing or harassment laws, for instance) to convict R.A.V. without implicating the First 
Amendment. 
The majority opinion rejected several notions of the importance of community values and 
identity. Scalia explicitly denied the legitimacy of a legal argument that seeks to protect 
marginalized groups through content-based speech regulations. In doing so, he denied the ability 
of each community to define what forms of communication are acceptable and what forms are 
	   56 
not — in the case of St. Paul, for instance, the city wished to define hateful communication based 
upon race, gender, and creed as unacceptable. But this tactic is deemed inappropriate when the 
Court places greater value on the individual’s right to speak even hateful ideas as far greater than 
the right of the community to create boundaries for acceptable speech. This preference for 
R.A.V.’s speech rights over the emotional injuries caused by hateful speech is a demonstration of 
logic that prioritizes individual rights over communal values; once again, the Court’s logic aligns 
closely with liberal thinking. 
3. White’s Concurrence 
The concurring opinion, authored by Justice White and joined by three other justices, 
disagreed with the logic of the majority, but agreed with the outcome, finding that the statute was 
overbroad because it prohibited protected speech. First, White pointed out that the Court 
frequently allows for content-based regulations of some forms of speech, particularly those 
forms that are considered of little value to society. He offered as an example obscenity and libel 
laws that forbid some forms of speech on the basis of content, and took issue with the majority’s 
assertion that the only acceptable law regulating fighting words would have to regulate all 
fighting words and not just some. White wrote: 
Any contribution of this holding [the majority] to First Amendment jurisprudence is 
surely a negative one, since it necessarily signals that expressions of violence, such as the 
message of intimidation and racial hatred conveyed by burning a cross on someone's 
lawn, are of sufficient value to outweigh the social interest in order and morality that has 
traditionally placed such fighting words outside the First Amendment. (505 U.S. 377, 
402) (White, J., concurring) 
 
Because fighting words fall outside the protection of the First Amendment, according to White, 
they can be regulated based upon their content, similar to obscene speech. White took issue with 
the Court’s finding that content-based regulations of speech “outside the First Amendment” are 
facially unconstitutional (505 U.S. 377, 403) (White, J., concurring). 
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White also reproached Scalia’s contention that the St. Paul ordinance fails strict scrutiny 
because it could potentially be accomplished in a content-neutral manner. White pointed out that 
to require a content-neutral ordinance would be to require the regulation of even more speech, 
paradoxically creating a less narrowly tailored ordinance. He emphasized that the ordinance is a 
reflection of St. Paul’s determination as to which speech is most harmful to the city, writing, 
“This selective regulation reflects the city's judgment that harms based on race, color, creed, 
religion, or gender are more pressing public concerns than the harms caused by other fighting 
words” (505 U.S. 377, 407) (White, J., concurring). 
Rather than following the logic of the majority, the concurrence found that the St. Paul 
ordinance was overbroad. The speech covered by the statute did not rise to the level of fighting 
words because the expression was not likely to spark a violent response or injury. “The mere fact 
that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not render the 
expression unprotected” (505 U.S. 377, 414) (White, J., concurring). 
Like the majority opinion, this concurrence denies the ability of St. Paul to determine 
what language is harmful enough to require regulation. Although the concurring opinion 
recognizes that St. Paul might wish to regulate some speech on the basis that its harms are more 
substantial, the opinion also emphasizes that a real, physical injury must follow from speech for 
it to be considered regulatable. This is yet another iteration of the Court’s preference for 
individual rights over the ability of communities to selectively regulate speech on the basis of the 
harms it causes.  
4. Blackmun’s Concurrence 
Justice Blackmun authored another concurring opinion, in which he took issue with some 
of the reasoning in Justice White’s concurrence. Blackmun emphasized the importance of 
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context in defining the lines of free speech, and particularly the importance of flexibility in the 
creation of speech categories like obscenity. Offering what he described as a “more complex and 
subtle analysis,” he concluded that a “selective, subject-matter regulation of proscribable speech 
is constitutional” (505 U.S. 377, 428-429) (Blackmun, J., concurring).  
Blackmun concluded that the St. Paul statute is overbroad, but wrote that if it were not so, 
he would have voted to uphold it on the grounds that the law is not a viewpoint-based regulation 
of speech, but a subject-matter regulation, in the sense that it equally prohibits both sides of a 
debate from engaging in the same types of speech — a Muslim may not verbally attack a 
Catholic on the basis of religion, but neither may a Catholic verbally attack a Muslim on the 
same grounds. Were the St. Paul ordinance not overbroad, it would pass constitutional muster 
because it regulated proscribable fighting words and merely took into account the different 
harms caused by different types of fighting words. 
Blackmun’s solo concurrence emphasized the context surrounding speech regulations, 
allowing room for communities to enact subject-based regulations of speech that consider the 
different ways in which proscribable speech can be harmful. If St. Paul decided that racial, 
gendered, or religious hate speech caused significant harm, then the city should rightfully be able 
to enact very limited legislation preventing that speech’s utterance by all, not just by one side of 
a debate. Blackmun demonstrated an approach more similar to communitarianism in his 
concurrence, although his conclusion matched the majority’s. 
E. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) 
1. Background 
 Barry Black led a Ku Klux Klan rally on private property in Cana, Virginia. The rally, 
which ended with the burning of a large cross, was comprised of about thirty participants who 
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were visible and audible from off the property, according to neighbors and passersby. One 
neighbor, Rebecca Sechrist, stated later that she felt “scared” when she heard rally participants 
saying they wanted to “randomly shoot the blacks” and after witnessing the cross burning from a 
nearby property. Black was charged and found guilty of violating a Virginia statute that forbade 
cross burning with the intent of intimidating any person. The law went further, stating, “Any 
such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group 
of persons” (538 U.S. 343, 348, citing the Virginia statute). In a separate case that was joined 
with Black’s, two other men were convicted under the same statute after setting fire to a wooden 
cross they placed in a black neighbor’s front yard. 
2. Plurality Opinion 
 In a divided plurality decision authored by Justice O’Connor, the Court overturned 
Black’s conviction, finding that it was permissible for Virginia to ban cross burnings if their 
purpose was intimidation, but that that intent could not be assumed in all instances of cross 
burning. Five justices agreed to the conclusion that Black’s conviction should be overturned, 
although several disagreed with O’Connor’s logic and four authored concurring, dissenting, or 
mixed opinions. O’Connor reasoned that it is permissible to issue content-based bans on “true 
threats,” in which “the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to 
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group” — the government may, 
for example, ban threats upon the President’s life based on the content of the threats (538 U.S. 
343, 359). Because of the threatening symbolism inherent in burning a cross, and because the 
Virginia law did not distinguish between types of intimidation (intimidation based upon race 
versus religion, for example) a ban on cross burning for the purpose of intimidation was deemed 
acceptable. 
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However, as O’Connor pointed out, not all cross burnings are intended to intimidate, 
although they may have that effect. In some cases, cross burnings have been used as a 
celebratory symbol for members of the Ku Klux Klan, or as expression of political views — 
thus, the assertion in the Virginia law that cross burning alone is enough to indicate an intent to 
intimidate was found to be a violation of the First Amendment because it suppressed protected 
expression. Thus, “the provision as so interpreted ‘would create an unacceptable risk of the 
suppression of ideas’” (538 U.S. 343, 365). The prima facie evidence provision of the Virginia 
law was thus found to be facially invalid. 
Interestingly, the plurality opinion specified that the context surrounding a cross burning 
be taken into account when considering whether it was undertaken with the intent of intimidating 
others. This perspective defended individuals’ right to burn a cross for non-threatening reasons, 
suggesting a fit with liberal theory, and it also proposed that the context of the action is relevant 
to the decision — that cross burning has some importance to the “white supremacist 
community,” as it were, was deemed relevant to the Court’s decision. Thus, this case emphasized 
the importance of protecting the speech rights of all groups, even those with repugnant views, in 
order to ensure individual freedom of speech in as many circumstances as possible. 
3. Stevens’ Concurrence 
 Justice Stevens added a very brief concurring opinion to state that cross burning that is 
intended to intimidate is unquestionably within a category of speech that the government may 
regulate. He was joined in part by Justices Scalia and Souter. Here, Stevens defended the 
government’s need to protect its citizens from fear of bodily harm over the right of KKK 
members to burn crosses if that action’s intent is to threaten, making an argument that seems to 
align with the communitarian perspective. 
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4. Thomas’ Dissent 
 Justice Thomas, joined in part by Justices Scalia and Souter, dissented from Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion on the grounds that the action of burning a cross should not be considered to 
have an expressive component. Thomas argued that the symbol of a burning cross is so culturally 
intertwined with a particular message that it is always threatening. “In our culture, cross burning 
has almost invariably meant lawlessness and understandably instills in its victims well-grounded 
fear of physical violence” (538 U.S. 343, 391) (Thomas, J., dissenting). As evidence of this 
conclusion, Thomas cited the fact that the Virginia statute in question was approved by a firmly 
segregationist legislature in the state — “even segregationists understood the difference between 
intimidating and terroristic conduct and racist expression,” Thomas wrote (538 U.S. 343, 394) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion posited that the Court should consider the right 
of passersby to avoid the fear and distress a cross burning can cause. “That cross burning 
subjects it targets, and, sometimes, an unintended audience, … to extreme emotional distress, 
and is virtually never viewed merely as ‘unwanted communication,’ but rather, as a physical 
threat, is of no concern to the plurality” (538 U.S. 343, 400) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 Thomas offered a historically based explanation as to why the context surrounding cross 
burning, as well as its impact upon those who view it, should be part of the Court’s 
considerations. Thomas believed the history of violence that is strongly associated with cross 
burning should be a factor in deciding whether the practice can ever be non-threatening; under 
his assertions, it cannot. The history of cross burning is so inextricable from the fear it instills in 
its viewers that any instance of cross burning can be assumed to threaten and intimidate, no 
matter the intent behind it. Thomas’ argument resonates with the communitarian view that social 
order and values should outweigh individual rights to expression in some instances. Preventing 
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the burning of crosses to protect marginalized members of society is a strong example of the 
communitarian understanding of the necessary limits of free speech, although once again, it 
makes its appearance in a dissenting opinion rather than a majority. 
5. Scalia’s Part-Concurrence, Part-Dissent 
 Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality’s finding that a law banning cross burnings 
intended to intimidate would be constitutional, but disagreed with the finding that the prima facie 
evidence provision is facially unconstitutional. Scalia wrote that the plurality must have applied 
some form of the “overbreadth” doctrine to find the statute facially unconstitutional, but argued 
that the class of people who might be injured by the law’s possibly unconstitutional aspects is so 
small as to prevent the use of “overbreadth” to strike down the law. Scalia determined, in a 
technical argument, that the law would only injure those persons who burn a cross without 
threatening intentions, are prosecuted, and then refuse to offer a defense. Because this class is so 
small as to be practically nonexistent, Scalia concluded that an “overbreadth” finding by the 
plurality is inapposite. Scalia’s opinion offers little substantive First Amendment logic, and as 
such offers little for analysis in this project. 
6. Souter’s Part-Concurrence, Part-Dissent 
 Justice Souter argued that the Virginia statutes should be overturned entirely because it is 
a content-based regulation of expression. By choosing to proscribe the burning of a cross rather 
than any other symbolic expression with the intent to intimidate, the state regulates on the basis 
of an ideology it wishes to squelch, in this case, violent white supremacy. “But even when the 
symbolic act is meant to terrify, a burning cross may carry a further, ideological message of 
white Protestant supremacy” (538 U.S. 343, 381) (Souter, J., concurring).  
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Souter’s opinion strongly supported an individual’s right to self-expression, even in 
extreme ways, as part of the marketplace of ideas. Souter suggested that so long as an action 
expresses an ideology, it is protected under the First Amendment, regardless of its impact upon 
viewers. His opinion fit closely with liberalism in that it greatly preferred individual rights over 
the social order or the need to protect marginalized groups. 
F. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) 
1. Background 
 In Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011), the Westboro Baptist Church picketed near a 
U.S. soldier’s funeral, causing emotional distress to the soldier’s father, Albert Snyder. Albert 
Snyder argued that the church members’ signs, which bore messages like “Thank God for Dead 
Soldiers,” caused substantial emotional distress worthy of financial compensation. Snyder 
testified at the initial trial on this matter that “he is unable to separate the thought of his dead son 
from his thoughts of Westboro's picketing, and that he often becomes tearful, angry, and 
physically ill when he thinks about it” (562 U.S. 443, 450). The church had alerted local 
authorities to the fact that they would be picketing, and they completed their protest on public 
land that was about 1,000 feet away from the funeral service. A jury found in Snyder’s favor and 
awarded him sizable damages, but the decision was reversed on appeal to the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
2. Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court upheld the Court of Appeals’ decision and held 8-1 that Snyder was 
not owed damages. Chief Justice Roberts authored the majority opinion, Justice Breyer offered a 
concurrence, and Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion. Roberts presented the constitutional 
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question at hand as “whether the First Amendment shields the church members from tort liability 
for their speech in this case” (562 U.S. 443, 447). The majority held that it does.  
 The Court found this primarily because the Westboro Baptist Church’s speech is 
considered speech on a matter of public concern — the church protests criticized U.S. policies, 
especially the inclusion of gays in the military. Because the speech touched on issues that were 
up for public debate, it is granted some of the strongest protection the First Amendment can 
offer. Quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 270, Roberts wrote in Snyder that “the 
First Amendment reflects ‘a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’” (562 U.S. 443, 452). Roberts went on to 
define a public issue as any of “political, social, or other concern to the community” (562 U.S. 
443, 453). Even in a case such as this one, where the speech in question makes a “negligible” 
contribution to the marketplace of ideas, speech of public concern is offered strong First 
Amendment protection (562 U.S. 443, 460). Alternatively, Roberts wrote that the restriction of 
speech on private issues is of less concern from a free speech perspective (562 U.S. 443, 452). 
The Westboro Baptist Church’s speech also met the time, place, and manner restrictions in place 
in Maryland (where the picketing took place), meaning their speech did not violate any laws, 
which might grant it less protection. “Simply put, the church members had the right to be where 
they were,” Roberts wrote (562 U.S. 443, 457). 
 The majority does note that many considered the speech in question reprehensible. 
Roberts wrote, “Westboro's choice to convey its views in conjunction with Matthew Snyder's 
funeral made the expression of those views particularly hurtful to many, especially to Matthew's 
father” (562 U.S. 443, 456). However, the emotional harm caused by the speech does not 
disqualify it from First Amendment protection. The majority stated, “given that Westboro's 
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speech was at a public place on a matter of public concern, that speech is entitled to ‘special 
protection’ under the First Amendment. Such speech cannot be restricted simply because it is 
upsetting or arouses contempt” (562 U.S. 443, 458, citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 414).  
 This opinion is an example of the Court’s use of logic that parallels liberalism. In Snyder, 
the Court offered steadfast protection for speech that most Americans find disgusting. In an 
editorial, The New York Times described the Westboro Baptist Church’s signs as “hurtful and 
hateful” (2011). In her analysis of this case, Christina Wells wrote for The California Law 
Review that “Few people will lose sleep if the Court finds that the First Amendment allows 
Albert Snyder to sue the Phelpses for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of 
privacy for protesting near his son’s funeral” — but, in the end, the Court did not take this 
position (2010). The Westboro Baptist Church’s message, which conveys the belief that God is 
punishing the United States for its collective sins by killing soldiers, has been maligned in the 
press and in public opinion generally. Taken in combination with the traditional American belief 
in the heroism of U.S. soldiers and the sanctity of religious ceremonies such as funerals, the 
Westboro Baptist Church’s ideas are perhaps some of the most consistently despised in recent 
memory. 
 In spite of these facts, which Roberts came very close to openly acknowledging in his 
opinion, the church’s speech was granted “special protection” because of its contribution to 
public discourse, no matter how minimal that contribution might be considered by the majority. 
The majority chose to maintain the neutrality of the government by prohibiting interference in 
the marketplace of ideas. Just as Sandel describes the liberal view of free speech as “the idea that 
government should be neutral among competing conceptions of the good life,” the Court in 
Snyder found that even when a majority of Americans agree on a conception of the good life that 
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is contrary to that forwarded by the Westboro Baptist Church, the government may not favor one 
side over another in this debate (2005, 212). The preservation of the individuals’ right to express 
controversial views, so long as they are relevant to issues of public importance, is emphasized in 
this decision. 
 Also relevant is the fact that the emotional harm caused by this speech was not 
considered an adequate reason for limiting the speech. Smolla writes of the liberal perspective 
that “some injury more palpable than moral outrage is required” to regulate speech (1990, 175). 
The Court found in Snyder that even “outrageous” or “hateful” speech could not be limited on 
the basis that it offended listeners, again defending a basic liberal principle. Wells writes, “the 
Court protects offensive speech for two reasons. First, speech on matters of public concern 
retains its value even when delivered in an offensive manner. Second, attempts to punish 
offensive speech too often lead to censorship of unpopular ideas” (2010). Snyder demonstrates 
the Court’s use of both lines of logic — the Westboro Baptist Church was afforded protection 
precisely because its speech was so unpopular and required defense, and because its speech was 
about a matter of public significance, even though it was presented in a manner of which many 
disapproved. Roberts concluded the majority opinion with this assertion on the value of free 
speech:  
Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and 
sorrow, and — as it did here — inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react 
to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course — 
to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public 
debate. (562 U.S. 443, 460–461) 
 
In this short paragraph, Roberts emphasized the “free market” principle that is central to the 
liberal understanding of free speech: the principle that the truth will best be reached through 
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almost entirely free speech, and that offense or even deep pain does not justify the regulation of 
political speech in the public arena.  
However, Roberts also presented a viewpoint that could be seen as communitarian when 
he wrote in the quote above, “As a Nation we have chosen a different course” (562 U.S. 443, 
461). This statement suggests that Roberts saw free speech as an essential value of the United 
States and of Americans. By defending this shared value, was Roberts in fact defending what he 
sees as a communal value that is important to our identities as Americans? While this would be 
an extremely broad interpretation of what makes up a “community,” it is possible that Roberts’ 
assertion could represent a middle ground between liberals and communitarians, where 
individual free speech is one of the communal values on which we base our identities. 
3. Breyer’s Concurrence 
 Justice Breyer joined the majority but added his belief that the government may restrict 
picketing in some circumstances, even if that picketing is on a matter of public concern. Breyer 
gave the example of fighting words to illustrate the notion that the manner in which speech is 
delivered can impact its constitutionality. The concurring opinion simply emphasized that private 
individuals can be protected from obnoxious or hateful speech in some limited circumstances. 
Breyer wrote, “As I understand the Court’s opinion, it does not hold or imply that the State is 
always powerless to provide private individuals with necessary protection” (562 U.S. 443, 462) 
(Breyer, J., concurring). In his opinion, Breyer backed logic similar to the liberal principle of 
defending most speech; this logic still allows room, however, for the communitarian idea going 
back to Chaplinsky and fighting words — that some speech, when its aim is to harm others, is 
not deserving of constitutional protection. 
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4. Alito’s Dissent 
Justice Alito began his dissent in frank contrast to the majority opinion: “Our profound 
national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that 
occurred in this case” (562 U.S. 443, 463) (Alito, J., dissenting).  Alito characterized the 
Westboro Baptist Church’s messages as making “no contribution to public debate,” particularly 
because of the resulting “severe emotional injury on persons at a time of intense emotional 
sensitivity” (562 U.S. 443, 464) (Alito, J., dissenting). The emotional harm caused by the 
church’s signs and messages, Alito found, extended far enough to render the speech essentially 
fighting words: they “‘by their very utterance inflict[ed] injury’” and “form[ed] ‘no essential part 
of any exposition of ideas,’” under the definitions provided in Chaplinsky. (562 U.S. 443, 465) 
(Alito, J., dissenting). Alito argued that the protest, which specifically targeted Albert Snyder’s 
son, was not on issues of public importance but rather a personal attack that was not deserving of 
First Amendment protection. Finally, Alito wrote that “funerals are unique events at which 
special protection against emotional assaults is in order,” suggesting that although the speech 
occurred in a public space, it intruded on a private event and emotionally harmed those present to 
the extent that First Amendment protection for the speech could be diminished (562 U.S. 443, 
473) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
These appeals harkened back to the fighting words doctrine, which found that some 
speech was so harmful and of so little value to society that it could be limited. Alito also 
appealed to a cultural idea of funerals as sacred and protected spaces in which families should be 
safe from emotionally harmful speech. Both these ideas refer to a communitarian principle that 
the right to speech can be limited when the speech in question is inherently harmful. Speech that 
inflicts harm on a private person during an emotionally vulnerable time can be limited, Alito 
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argued. This logic, however, is not widely supported by the Court. Alito stood alone in his view 
of Snyder, and refers back to Chaplinsky, which has been significantly limited since it was 
decided in 1942. Alito’s dissent, while using logic similar to communitarian principles, also 
demonstrated the very narrow support for these principles within the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
II. Campus Speech Code Cases 
A. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) 
1. Background 
 The University of Michigan felt compelled to craft a speech policy restricting “Any 
behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, 
handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status” after a series of racist incidents on the campus (721 F. 
Supp. 852, 856). The incidents included one in which an unknown person distributed fliers that 
used racist stereotypes and stated it was “open season” on black students; in another, a Ku Klux 
Klan uniform was displayed from the window of a dormitory (721 F. Supp. 852, 854). 
After much pressure from students and the threat of a lawsuit against the school for failing to 
create a safe learning environment, the school sought to end these incidents through a campus 
speech policy. The policy limited the areas in which speech was regulated, specifically leaving 
out public areas of campus and campus-sponsored newspapers — according to the code itself, 
only speech in academic, study, and recreational centers could be subject to regulation and 
penalties (721 F. Supp. 852, 856). 
 Students found in violation of the code were first required to go through a mediation 
process that could be followed by a formal hearing if the mediation was unsuccessful. Sanctions 
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ranging from a “formal reprimand” to expulsion, in more extreme cases, could be meted out at 
either stage in the process (721 F. Supp. 852, 857). Doe, an anonymous student, sued on the 
grounds that he felt his ability to speak on controversial topics in class had been “chilled” by the 
policy. 
2. Opinion 
District Judge Avern Cohn authored the opinion, which nullified the University of 
Michigan’s speech policy. His decision began by determining whether Doe had standing in the 
case. Cohn decided that although the policy had never been applied to Doe, he had standing to 
bring the suit because he had a reasonable fear of being sanctioned if he were to discuss “certain 
controversial theories positing biologically-based differences between sexes and races” in his 
graduate-level biology classes (721 F. Supp. 852, 858). Cohn concluded that because the 
University had applied the policy to students who discussed controversial topics that offended 
fellow students in classes, that Doe had reason to fear sanctions. 
Cohn’s opinion included an analysis of the type of speech being regulated by the policy. 
Importantly, he found that the University would be within its rights to regulate certain types of 
“verbal conduct,” as is the case in the regulation of workplace sexual harassment. However, the 
University’s ability to regulate “pure speech” is limited to specific categories, including fighting 
words, credible threats, and obscenity (721 F. Supp. 852, 862–863). Cohn pointed out that some 
language covered by the policy could be considered fighting words: “Under certain 
circumstances racial and ethnic epithets, slurs, and insults might fall within this description and 
could constitutionally be prohibited by the University” (721 F. Supp. 852, 862). 
However, he reasoned that the University could not “establish an anti-discrimination 
policy which had the effect of prohibiting certain speech because it disagreed with ideas or 
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messages sought to be conveyed. … Nor could the University proscribe speech simply because it 
was found to be offensive, even gravely so, by large numbers of people” (721 F. Supp. 852, 
863). Cohn emphasized the importance of free speech in the university setting, where “the free 
and unfettered interplay of competing views is essential to the institution's educational mission” 
(721 F. Supp. 852, 863). 
Cohn found the University’s policy overbroad because it was applied to students who 
engaged in speech protected by the First Amendment. Students who raised controversial 
opinions during class discussions had been found to be in violation of the school’s policy on 
several specific occasions, in spite of the fact that their opinions were protected speech. Further, 
the fact that the University failed to offer a clear distinction between protected and unprotected 
speech in the policy meant that it could also be classified as vague. As such, with the policy 
being found to be both vague and overbroad, it was declared unconstitutional and the University 
was prohibited from continuing to enforce it. 
Cohn concluded, “While the Court is sympathetic to the University's obligation to ensure 
equal educational opportunities for all of its students, such efforts must not be at the expense of 
free speech. Unfortunately, this was precisely what the University did” (721 F. Supp. 852, 868). 
Here, Cohn expressly acknowledged the University’s competing mandates to defend both equal 
protection and free speech; he determines, however, that free speech may not be diluted in the 
course of attempting to ensure equal protection. Cohn’s ruling lands squarely in favor of 
individual rights and the marketplace of ideas — his reasoning emphasized the importance of 
controversial ideas in the classroom and of each individual’s right to espouse those ideas. In 
reaching this conclusion, Cohn followed the Supreme Court’s pattern of using logic that weighs 
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individual rights more heavily than communal values, applying this logic to academia in the 
same way the Supreme Court has applied it to other communities. 
Although Cohn found the policy to be facially overbroad and vague, Cohn left room for 
the existence of a speech code that, if differently conceived, could be constitutional. He also 
showed sympathy for those students who the policy sought to protect: minority and female 
students who were subjected to hateful speech on their campus. He wrote, “It is an unfortunate 
fact of our constitutional system that the ideals of freedom and equality are often in conflict. The 
difficult and sometimes painful task of our political and legal institutions is to mediate the 
appropriate balance between these two competing values” (721 F. Supp. 852, 853). Thus, the 
Doe v. University of Michigan opinion represents Cohn’s best effort to balance the interests of 
equality and free speech. In this instance, the Michigan policy was found to go too far, but Cohn 
left open the possibility of speech codes on campuses, so long as they offer adequate protection 
for free speech. 
B. UWM Post v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 774 F. Supp. 1163 
(E.D. Wis. 1991) 
 
1. Background 
 The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin ordered all schools in the 
University of Wisconsin system to adopt a “Design for Diversity” plan in response to a number 
of high profile incidents of racism. These incidents included the installation of a large statue of a 
black “islander” at a fraternity party, a racially motivated fight between two fraternities, and a 
fraternity’s depiction of a “slave auction,” in which students wore blackface and caricatured 
black Americans in a skit (774 F. Supp. 1163, 1165). As part of their implementation of the 
“Design for Diversity” plan, the University of Wisconsin-Madison asked several of its law 
professors to design a new rule for the student conduct code; the code they proposed was shortly 
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approved by the Board of Regents for use in the entire University of Wisconsin system. The rule 
required that actionable speech or expressive conduct meet the following four characteristics: 
“(1) Be racist or discriminatory; 
(2) Be directed at an individual; 
(3) Demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sexual orientation, national origin, 
ancestry or age of the individual addressed; and 
(4) Create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education, university-
related work, or other university-authorized activity” (774 F. Supp. 1163, 1166) 
 
The rule also came with a detailed brochure explaining how the rule should be applied. The 
UWM Post, Inc., an independent student newspaper at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 
and several other plaintiffs, asked the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin to find 
the rule facially invalid on the grounds that it violated the First Amendment. At the time of the 
lawsuit, nine students had been punished under the rule — for the most part, each was at a 
different University of Wisconsin campus. 
2. Opinion 
 Judge Warren began his opinion with an analysis of the overbreadth doctrine. While the 
plaintiffs argued that the rule was overbroad because it regulated protected speech, the 
University of Wisconsin argued the rule regulated only fighting words as outlined in Chaplinsky. 
Warren wrote, “the Chaplinsky Court set out a two-part definition for fighting words: (1) words 
which by their very utterance inflict injury and (2) words which by their very utterance tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace” (774 F. Supp. 1163, 1169). He added, however, that the 
Supreme Court has narrowed the definition of fighting words since Chaplinsky, scrapping the 
first half of the original definition and limiting the second half so it only included words that 
provoke an immediate violent response and that are directed at the hearer (774 F. Supp. 1163, 
1170). 
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 Warren determined that because the language of the University of Wisconsin rule did not 
require that regulatable speech “tend to incite immediate violent reaction,” the rule was outside 
the scope of the fighting words doctrine. Thus, in a somewhat paradoxical decision, Warren 
found that the lack of a violent response to some speech the rule regulated, even to speech that 
intimidated listeners, was dispositive in determining that the rule covered more than just fighting 
words. 
 Thus, because the rule regulated more than just fighting words, Warren declined to use 
the balancing test laid out in Chaplinsky, because to do so would require that he create a new 
category of unprotected speech and because the rule was a content-based regulation. Warren also 
reasoned that even those who used racial epithets were engaging in speech with some social 
value because the epithets served “to inform their listeners of their racist or discriminatory 
views” (774 F. Supp. 1163, 1175). Warren went so far as to say the rule actually impaired 
diversity: “By establishing content-based restrictions on speech, the rule limits the diversity of 
ideas among students and thereby prevents the ‘robust exchange of ideas’ which intellectually 
diverse campuses provide” (774 F. Supp. 1163, 1176). He also dismissed the University of 
Wisconsin’s argument that the rule fulfilled its mandate to provide equal opportunities to 
education for all students, arguing that the rule regulated student behavior rather than state 
employees’ behavior. Warren wrote, “Since students are generally not state actors, the Board's 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection argument is inapplicable to this case” (774 F. Supp. 
1163, 1176). 
 Thus, because the rule covered protected speech and did not offer compelling reasons to 
regulate such speech, Warren found the rule to be overbroad. He also found the rule to be vague, 
as it did not clarify whether the speaker had to “actually create a hostile educational environment 
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or whether speaker must merely intend to create such an environment” to violate the rule (774 F. 
Supp. 1163, 1179). As such, Warren declared the rule facially invalid because of its violations of 
the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines. 
 Like Doe v. University of Michigan, this case favored individual rights over the 
University of Wisconsin’s wish to take measures to provide a more comfortable community for 
its students. Although Judge Warren recognized that schools have a Fourteenth Amendment 
obligation to provide equal educational opportunities to students regardless of race, gender, 
religion, or other characteristics, he wrote in his opinion that a campus speech code that regulates 
student discussion cannot have an impact upon the equal protection mandate because students 
are not state actors. As long as the school itself is offering students equal opportunities, Warren 
reasoned, it is in compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment — students’ racist speech is a 
different issue entirely from equal protection. Like in Doe v. University of Michigan, the opinion 
in this case offers ideas about how to craft a constitutional speech code. In this case, Warren 
proposed that a speech code would have to specify that the objectionable speech must be likely 
to trigger an immediate violent response to fit in the fighting words doctrine and cover only 
unprotected speech. He also laid out just how narrow the fighting words doctrine has become, 
suggesting that only a very limited speech code would be acceptable under the doctrine. 
C. Iota Xi Chapter Of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. George Mason University, 993 F.2d 386 
(4th Cir. 1993) 
  
1. Background 
 On April 4, 1991, the Iota Xi chapter of the Sigma Chi fraternity at George Mason 
University, a state school, hosted an event called “Dress a Sig,” in which participants were to 
dress as “ugly women.” One wore blackface and dressed as a black woman. The group had been 
granted permission by the University in advance of the event, but the school imposed sanctions 
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against the group after students complained that they were offended by the racial and sexual 
stereotypes portrayed at the “Dress a Sig” event. The fraternity was required to suspend all 
activities for a two-year period, with the exception of pre-approved activities focused on cultural 
awareness. The fraternity filed suit, claiming that its rights under the First Amendment were 
violated by the sanctions. This circuit court decision is distinct from the district court decision on 
the same case discussed by Shiell and in Chapter One of this project. 
2. Majority Opinion 
 Judge Sprouse authored the majority opinion. Judge Widener joined Sprouse in the 
opinion, and Judge Murnaghan authored a concurring opinion. Sprouse first determined that the 
fraternity’s conduct was “expressive and thus entitled to First Amendment protection” (993 F.2d 
386, 391). The “obvious sophomoric nature” of the production was not enough to strip it of the 
protection of the First Amendment (993 F.2d 386, 389). Because the fraternity intended to 
express a message through the skit, and because that message was likely to be understood by 
others, the skit passed the test for expressive conduct laid out in Texas v. Johnson: “What is 
evident is that the Fraternity's purposefully nonsensical treatment of sexual and racial themes 
was intended to impart a message that the University's concerns, in the Fraternity's view, should 
be treated humorously” (993 F.2d 386, 392). 
When the University punished a skit that expressed mockery for the University’s desire 
for racial and gender equality, it unconstitutionally barred one viewpoint while expressing 
preference for its own. “The First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing 
… expressive conduct because of disapproval of the ideas expressed” (993 F.2d 386, 393, citing 
Texas v. Johnson). As such, Sprouse found that the University’s sanctions against the fraternity 
could not be enforced. 
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Once again, the majority opinion protects individual freedom over the University’s ability 
to decide what speech and expressive conduct is acceptable. In this case, George Mason did not 
have an explicit speech code, but rather chose to penalize the fraternity based upon its offensive 
message. This gave the school even less ground to stand on than the University of Michigan or 
the University of Wisconsin, which had written codes, because George Mason seemed to be 
penalizing the group simply for mocking the school’s emphasis on racial and gender equality. 
The court here seriously limited George Mason University’s ability to restrict speech that was 
considered offensive on the basis of racist or sexist content. 
3. Murnaghan’s Concurrence 
Judge Murnaghan agreed with the majority opinion’s decision to halt the enactment of 
sanctions against the fraternity, but felt the decision went too far. “By holding that the First 
Amendment prohibits any action by a public university to prevent or punish offensive conduct 
like that at issue, the majority goes much further than necessary,” Murnaghan wrote (993 F.2d 
386, 394) (Murnaghan, J., concurring). Murnaghan argued the majority could have come to the 
same conclusion simply by holding that the University could not punish the fraternity for an 
event that had already garnered the school’s approval. However, Murnaghan emphasized that a 
content-based speech regulation could be permissible if the University demonstrated that it was a 
narrowly tailored means of achieving a compelling state interest — that is, if the University’s 
measures passed strict scrutiny. In this case, the University should have been granted the ability 
to punish the skit because it must be able to protect other students, Murnaghan wrote. “The 
University must have some leeway to regulate conduct which counters that interest, and thereby 
infringes upon the right of other students to learn” (993 F.2d 386, 395).  
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This opinion offers a more balanced view of the competing interests faced by the 
University than that of the majority. Murnaghan wrote in favor of the University’s ability to limit 
some speech or expressive content in favor of protecting other students’ ability to learn in a safe 
and welcoming environment. Further, Murnaghan recognized that the University has more than 
just an educational mission — it must also ensure that diversity is fostered and that minority and 
female students have equal opportunities to benefit from education. 
D. Corry v. Stanford University, No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995)  
1. Background 
 Although little background information is available for this case, its uniqueness in the 
body of judicial responses to campus speech codes necessitates its inclusion. The basic facts are 
as follows: Stanford University enacted a speech code “intended to clarify the point at which free 
expression ends and prohibited discriminatory harassment begins” (Corry v. Stanford 1). The 
speech code was intended only to prohibit fighting words under the definition provided in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. Robert Corry and several other students brought suit against the 
University under the state of California’s “Leonard Law,” which ensured students at private 
universities the same free speech rights as those at public universities; while normally a private 
institution would not be held to the standards of the First Amendment, Corry argued that the 
Leonard Law meant Stanford University was required to comply with the First Amendment. The 
court took on both the First Amendment issue as well as the question of the constitutionality of 
the Leonard Law. 
2. Opinion 
 Judge Stone authored the opinion in this case. Stanford University claimed that their 
speech code targeted only fighting words and did not prohibit the expression of any views, no 
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matter how objectionable; as such, the school argued, their policy covered only unprotected 
speech and held up under the First Amendment. However, like in Iota Xi v. George Mason 
University, the court found that the fighting words doctrine had been substantially narrowed 
since Chaplinsky. Using the same conception of fighting words as the court in George Mason, 
Stone here determined that the Stanford speech code regulated some protected speech: “On its 
face, the Speech Code prohibits words which will not only cause people to react violently, but 
also cause them to feel insulted or stigmatized” (Corry v. Stanford 8). Hurt feelings, Stone wrote, 
are not enough to render speech unprotected. Because the speech code regulated speech that 
expressed a protected message and did not merely prohibit speech that was likely to incite 
violence, it was found to be overbroad.  
 Further, even if the speech code only regulated fighting words, it would remain 
unconstitutional because it regulated those words on the basis of their content in a manner the 
Supreme Court forbade in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul. Like the ordinance in R.A.V., the Stanford 
speech code regulated speech based upon whether it expressed a hostile view on the basis of 
race, gender, religion, or creed. Stone applied strict scrutiny on the grounds that even a content-
based regulation of speech would be permissible if the University could demonstrate that it was a 
narrowly tailored means of achieving compelling state interests. Like in R.A.V., “the Court 
acknowledged that the ordinance supported a compelling interest because it sought to protect 
individuals, society at large, from various hateful discrimination” (Corry v. Stanford 18). 
However, Stone found that the University could use less restrictive measures to combat racism 
and encourage racial harmony. Judge Stone also found, using logic less relevant to this project, 
that California’s Leonard Law was constitutional and that it could be used to ensure that 
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Stanford’s speech code was in accordance with the First Amendment, in spite of the school’s 
status as a private institution. 
As in every other major campus speech code case in toto, the court here found in favor of 
individual freedom over even a private university’s ability to set standards for acceptable speech 
within the educational community. Although the court recognized the importance of creating a 
safe educational environment for all students in its strict scrutiny analysis, it ultimately found 
that universities must regulate as little speech as possible, or none at all, in the furtherance of that 
goal. Although Stanford University sought to create guidelines to prevent harassment, its efforts 
were squelched by a court that ruled these guidelines unconstitutional on the basis that they 
infringed individual speech rights. 
III. Conclusions 
 In my analysis of these cases, a clear pattern has emerged: the Supreme Court and the 
lower courts that follow its precedent have generally favored individual freedoms over shared 
communal values. Time and again, the courts have ruled in favor of individuals over 
communities that sought to implement standards of acceptable speech. Although courts have 
proposed constitutional alternatives in several cases, such as more narrowly tailored speech 
codes, it seems that colleges and local governments have yet to find a successful way to control 
hate speech. The fighting words doctrine, after which several universities tried to model their 
speech codes, has proven unhelpful because it has been narrowed so significantly since 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.  
 Thus, the courts have seemed to endorse the liberal conception of free speech over the 
communitarian one. The marketplace of ideas, in which unsavory speech can be best addressed 
through discourse, is frequently referenced in speech cases. Further, the idea that no content-
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based speech restrictions can be permitted on the grounds that the government cannot be given 
control of acceptable speech content is a substantial obstacle in the way of speech codes. The 
courts’ endorsement of these ideas have created a prevailing way of thinking about free speech in 
the legal system — a way of thinking in which individual rights to speak even hateful messages 
outweigh a community’s right to limit some speech to protect its people and to validate standards 
based upon communal values. Even if, in a given community, the entire group agreed upon the 
need the limit hateful speech in defense of the group’s values of equality, the courts would likely 
strike down such a limitation in defense of the right of a single person to enter the community 
and make his or her contrary ideas known. This principle applies, and has been applied, to 
universities, which have been entirely unsuccessful in crafting speech codes that are designed to 
protect their stated values of racial and gender equality. Colleges and universities have yet to 
make a convincing constitutional argument for the proposition that community values can 
sometimes outweigh individual freedoms. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CURRENT SPEECH DEBATES 
I. Overview 
The end of 2015 was marked by student protests across the United States. Most notably, 
students at Yale University and The University of Missouri in November engaged in highly 
publicized campaigns which, although distinct, revolved around the same basic principle: that 
predominantly white institutions are not doing enough to improve the racial climate in which 
students live and study. At Yale University, a controversial email exchange about culturally 
appropriative Halloween costumes sparked a major, days-long protest that caught national 
attention. One Yale lecturer suggested in an email to students that anyone offended by costumes 
they found culturally insensitive should “look away,” or engage with debates with the wearer, 
according to an Atlantic overview of student protests (Wong & Green 2016)5.  
The email, however, was largely agreed to be just a tipping point in a slow-burning sense 
of unwelcome and lack of support for students of color — there were reportedly a number of 
incidents, including “swastikas painted on campus, or a frat turning black girls away from a 
party,” leading up to the email, all of which made students of color feel unsafe on campus, 
according to another Atlantic article on the incident (White 2015). Thousands of students 
supported the protest and many of the protesters’ demands, including the hiring of more faculty 
members of color and an increase in support for campus cultural centers (Wong & Green 2016). 
At The University of Missouri, students began to protest after feeling their long-held 
concerns about the campus racial climate were not being taken seriously by administrators. 
“Black students have long described a segregated and unwelcoming environment at the 
university that administrators failed to address,” Wong and Green write. After University 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Please note that many citations in Chapters Four and Five do not include a page number because they refer to 
articles that are only available online. 
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President Tim Wolfe largely ignored student complaints, a large protest formed, including a 
strike by the school’s Division I football team and a faculty walkout. The massive protests 
received national attention and concluded with the resignation of Wolfe and another high-level 
administrator. Promises were also made regarding efforts to improve retention of students and 
faculty of color, as well as the hiring of a number of administrators devoted to making students 
of color more comfortable (Wong & Green 2016). The University of Missouri protest is widely 
credited for sparking a wide range of student protest movements surrounding racial climates on 
college campuses in the following weeks. 
These protests touched on speech issues in several ways. At Yale, many felt the student 
protesters were unwilling to engage in dialogue with anyone they disagreed with. In his Atlantic 
piece entitled “The New Intolerance of Student Activism,” journalist Conor Friedersdorf (2015) 
described the campus protests as “alarming”: “As students saw it, their pain ought to have been 
the decisive factor in determining the acceptability of the Halloween email. They thought their 
request for an apology ought to have been sufficient to secure one.” Protesters demanded the 
resignation of the Yale lecturer who sent the offending email (and the resignation of her husband, 
who is a Yale administrator), and reportedly spit on attendees as a conference on free speech 
being held at Yale University. The University of Missouri protests also raised questions when 
students and a faculty member forcibly removed photojournalists from a “safe space” on public 
land designated for students of color to mentally recuperate from the protests. The faculty 
member, Melissa Click, was suspended and then fired in February 2016, but according to a USA 
Today article, students protested for her reinstatement (Deutsch 2016). 
These incidents highlighted what many college students see as a fundamental tension 
between colleges’ and universities’ need to encourage free speech while also providing a safe 
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and comfortable home for students. As Friedersdorf (2015) put it, “The Yale student[s] appear to 
believe that creating an intellectual space and a home are at odds with each other.” Are they at 
odds? For many students of color, the way their white peers engage in “free expression” has long 
been a source of pain and resentment. The way their administrators react has been considered 
inadequate. Many outside observers in the media and the public at large took the protests at Yale 
and The University of Missouri (but particularly Yale) to be an example of the hypersensitivity 
of today’s college students. As one online commenter going by the username “Siestasis” 
remarked on a 2015 New York Times editorial about The University of Missouri and Yale: “So 
you are called a derogatory term, so you may have to listen to someone who has a different point 
of view. Grow up, it is a real world out there and these spoiled brats are not going to be ready for 
it.” 
But, as columnist Nicholas Kristof (2015) pointed out in the editorial to which that 
commenter added his or her view, “imagine if you’re an 18-year-old for whom this [campus] is 
your 24/7 home — named, say, for a 19th-century pro-slavery white supremacist.” Kristof was 
referencing the fact that many Yale students demanded the renaming of Calhoun College, named 
for pro-slavery advocate John C. Calhoun, as well as the idea that students of color at 
predominantly white institutions do experience challenges that can be difficult for white 
Americans to fathom. 
These examples of student protests offer only a small sampling of some of the speech 
issues that are implicated in recent campus activism. I will limit my analysis to two of the most 
notable speech debates: trigger warnings, or “alerts that professors are expected to issue if 
something in a course might cause a strong emotional response,” and microaggressions, or 
“small actions or word choices that seem on their face to have no malicious intent but that are 
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thought of as a kind of violence nonetheless,” as the terms are defined in Greg Lukianoff and 
Jonathan Haidt’s much-discussed 2015 Atlantic article, “The Coddling of the American Mind.” 
These terms represent some of the more popular expressions of campus activism’s impact on free 
speech: both have been popularized in recent years as they gained popularity on college 
campuses, and both have been the topics of heated debate among academics, students, and 
political commentators. 
II. Microaggressions 
A. Background 
 Even the definition of microaggressions is subject to extensive debate. For an alternative 
to Lukianoff and Haidt’s (2015) definition, we can look to Derald Wing Sue et al. (2007), who 
define racial microaggressions as follows: 
Brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, or environmental indignities, whether 
intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial 
slights and insults toward people of color. Perpetrators of microaggressions are often 
unaware that they engage in such communications when they interact with racial/ethnic 
minorities. (271) 
 
Wing Sue et al. emphasize that microaggressions are frequently unintentional and often seem 
minor or even invisible to anyone not on the receiving end. Perhaps for that reason, 
microaggressions have been much maligned on the Internet by those who see them as 
inconsequential slights that should be ignored or laughed off.6 
 Wing Sue, a professor of psychology at Columbia University, provides a useful example 
of a microaggression and its impact in his 2007 paper: 
I traveled with an African American colleague on a plane flying from New York to 
Boston. The plane was a small “hopper” with a single row of seats on one side and 
double seats on the other. As the plane was only sparsely populated, we were told by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For examples of columnists who consider microaggressions inconsequential, see Fleck’s (2015) “What Passes for 
Microaggressions at Columbia: White Male Professors, ‘Stressful Situations,’” and McArdle’s (2015) “How Grown-
Ups Deal with 'Microaggressions' Instead of Playing the Victim.” 
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flight attendant (White) that we could sit anywhere, so we sat at the front, across the aisle 
from one another. This made it easy for us to converse and provided a larger comfortable 
space on a small plane for both of us. As the attendant was about to close the hatch, three 
White men in suits entered the plane, were informed they could sit anywhere, and 
promptly seated themselves in front of us. Just before take-off, the attendant proceeded to 
close all overhead compartments and seemed to scan the plane with her eyes. At that 
point she approached us, leaned over, interrupted our conversation, and asked if we 
would mind moving to the back of the plane. She indicated that she needed to distribute 
weight on the plane evenly.  
 
Both of us (passengers of color) had similar negative reactions. First, balancing the 
weight on the plane seemed reasonable, but why were we being singled out? After all, we 
had boarded first and the three White men were the last passengers to arrive. Why were 
they not being asked to move? Were we being singled out because of our race? Was this 
just a random event with no racial overtones? Were we being oversensitive and petty?  
 
Although we complied by moving to the back of the plane, both of us felt resentment, 
irritation, and anger. In light of our everyday racial experiences, we both came to the 
same conclusion: The flight attendant had treated us like second-class citizens because of 
our race. (275) 
 
Wing Sue and his colleagues argue that microaggressions are ubiquitous, partly because those 
who use microaggressions may not be aware of the offense their words cause. “Microaggressive 
acts can usually be explained away by seemingly nonbiased and valid reasons. For the recipient 
of a microaggression, however, there is always the nagging question of whether it really 
happened,” Wing Sue et al. write (275). 
 On college campuses, microaggressions frequently take on an educational theme. 
Professors Solorzano, Ceja and Yosso (2000) write that many black college students report 
feeling discouraged by omnipresent microaggressions, many of which are also pointed out by 
Wing Sue: buildings named for wealthy white males, degrading comments by peers suggesting 
that black students are beneficiaries of affirmative action and do not really belong, low 
expectations on the part of faculty and staff, being expected to speak on behalf of all black 
people in classes and discussions. Solorzano et al. report that such microaggressions have caused 
many black students to feel they cannot succeed. “The sense of discouragement, frustration, and 
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exhaustion resulting from racial microaggressions left some African American students 
despondent and made them feel that they could not perform well academically” (Solorzano et al. 
2000, 69). 
 William A. Smith (2010), a professor of ethnic studies at The University of Utah, asserts 
that the buildup of racial microaggressions can give black college students “racial battle fatigue” 
and can significantly inhibit educational opportunities. The symptoms of “battle fatigue” can 
include both “psychological symptoms (e.g., frustration, shock, anger, disappointment, 
resentment, anxiety, helplessness, hopelessness, fear) and physiological symptoms (e.g., 
headaches, teeth grinding, chest pain, shortness of breath, high blood pressure, muscle aches, … 
fatigue, insomnia, frequent illness)” (Smith 2010, 268). These symptoms can add up over time 
and eventually harm the academic success of black students, Smith argues. Sumie Okazaki 
(2009), a professor of psychology at NYU Shanghai, agrees, writing that existing evidence 
regarding psychological responses to racism “suggest that perceived racism is associated with 
negative psychological states including symptoms of depression and anxiety, lower well-being, 
lower self-regard, and ill health” (105). Journalist Peter Schmidt (2015) reported in The 
Chronicle of Higher Education that a recent survey of minority students at the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign found that more than half had experienced racial microaggressions 
in the classroom. 
 Importantly, microaggressions are not considered to be a phenomenon solely directed at 
black Americans or even people of color generally. Although many definitions of the term use it 
solely to describe slights against people of color, Wing Sue writes in a Psychology Today article 
that microaggressions can be based upon gender, sexuality, religion, culture, ethnicity, disability, 
and other characteristics (2010).  
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 However, not all scholars agree that microaggressions are (or perhaps should be) as 
damaging as Wing Sue and others argue. Lukianoff and Haidt (2015) describe the recent 
awareness of microaggressions as part of a larger push to sanitize college campuses of painful or 
uncomfortable ideas. Lukianoff, president of the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education 
(FIRE), and Haidt, a social psychologist, allege that, in addition to the generally accepted 
definition of microaggressions, “the definition has expanded in recent years to include anything 
that can be perceived as discriminatory on virtually any basis” (2015). The authors argue that 
microaggressions can be explained in terms of two psychological terms: magnification, or 
“‘exaggerat[ing] the importance of things,’” and labeling, or “‘assign[ing] global negative traits 
to yourself and others’” (Lukianoff & Haidt 2015, citing Burns & Leahy, Holland & McGinn 
respectively). In other words, the authors argue student sensitivity to microaggressions is the 
result of a focus on victimhood that values exaggerated complaints and a disproportionate 
emphasis on individual discomfort.  
 Campbell and Manning, both professors of social theory, agree, asserting that students’ 
responses to microaggressions signify the prevalence of “victimhood culture,” which is 
“characterized by concern with status and sensitivity to slight combined with a heavy reliance on 
third parties” (2014, 715). The authors write, “When the victims publicize microaggressions they 
call attention to what they see as the deviant behavior of the offenders. In doing so they also call 
attention to their own victimization” (Campbell & Manning 2014, 707) Thus, there is literature 
that contends that microaggressions and their current popularity are the result of a trend of 
hypersensitivity on college campuses, not a heightened awareness and recognition of students’ 
legitimate grievances, and that attempts to regulate microaggressions are misguided. 
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B. Speech Implications 
 The trend toward regulating microaggressions has major implications for speech on 
college campuses. According to Schmidt, the Ithaca College Student Government Association is 
in the process of developing a microaggression reporting system by which slights can be reported 
anonymously to campus administrative authorities. Such reporting mechanisms became a 
popular request by student activists in the aftermath of the protests in November 2015 
(Statscavage 2015, Soave 2015, College Fix 2015). Schmidt (2015) reports that some are 
concerned about the effect these reporting systems may have on free speech, especially 
considering what phrases are being named as microaggressions. “The Foundation for Individual 
Rights in Education has sounded alarms about the Ithaca effort, saying the proposed reporting 
system lacks a clear definition of a microaggression — creating the potential for unjust 
accusations — and threatens to chill speech,” he writes (Schmidt 2015). 
 In addition to anonymous reporting systems, free speech advocates fear the effects of 
mandatory training on microaggressions for students and faculty, particularly when new faculty 
are without tenure and could fear repercussions if they disagree (Schmidt 2015). The types of 
microaggressions listed in these trainings are of additional concern: some seem to imply that 
certain opinions are microaggressions and thus impermissible. Schmidt (2015) writes: 
Free-speech concerns also have been raised in connection with faculty-training efforts at 
the University of Wisconsin at Stevens Point and at the University of California, a key 
battleground in the nation’s affirmative-action debate, which includes the statement 
"Affirmative action is racist" on its list of microaggressions.  
 
Students have also taken to demanding the resignations of administrators who engage in 
microaggressions. Journalist Emily Shire (2015) writes for The Daily Beast that an administrator 
at Claremont McKenna College quit her post in response to outrage after she emailed a student 
asking to discuss how to better serve minority students, describing them as “those that don’t fit 
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our CMC mold.” The lecturer who sent the explosive email regarding Halloween costumes at 
Yale has chosen not to return to her teaching post, according to Anemona Hartocollis (2015), a 
New York Times journalist. 
 These ongoing battles over microaggressions and how to fight them present serious 
questions regarding free speech and the free exchange of ideas on campuses. Whether some of 
the preventative measures taken by public colleges would be considered constitutional has yet to 
be determined, although Schmidt (2015) writes that FIRE has said it anticipates legal action in 
the future. 
III. Trigger Warnings 
A. Background 
 Like microaggression awareness, trigger warnings have recently gained popularity on 
college campuses. Kate Manne, a professor of philosophy at Cornell University, writes in an 
opinion piece for The New York Times that trigger warnings originated in online forums, where 
they serve as a caution to anyone who had experienced trauma: “The idea was to flag content 
that depicted or discussed common causes of trauma, like military combat, child abuse, incest, 
and sexual violence. People could then choose whether or not to engage with this material” 
(2015). In the classroom, Manne asserts, trigger warnings take the form of advance notice that 
allows students to prepare themselves for readings they might find traumatic. She argues that 
trigger warnings on class materials exist to warn students and allow them to prepare themselves, 
not to encourage them to skip the material entirely. 
 Trigger warnings, many argue, should be encouraged as a preventive measure against 
PTSD-like flashbacks to traumatic events. They are most frequently associated with sexual 
assault, but can be applied to many forms of trauma. Blogger Gillian Brown describes her 
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experience of being triggered on “The Body is Not an Apology,” a feminist blog, as follows: 
“Whenever I am exposed to things relating to death and certain illnesses, I suddenly and quite 
dramatically feel all-encompassing panic spread through my entire body. Sometimes, it goes 
away in seconds; at other times, it lingers for weeks, making it difficult to function normally” 
(2015). 
To many, trigger warnings are the college syllabus equivalent of a movie rating. 
Journalist Kat Stoeffel, writing for New York Magazine in 2015, describes trigger warnings 
before films as “a neutral disclaimer that impinges on neither the filmmaker’s freedom of speech 
nor the other students’ intellectual development. At worst, it’s a plot spoiler.” They exist to 
ensure that everyone can enjoy a safe and healthy classroom environment, proponents say.  
However, although trigger warnings are by no means ubiquitous at colleges, they have 
spread past the traditional use of warning victims of trauma about potentially triggering content. 
A draft of a 2013 Oberlin College guide on what material should be marked with trigger 
warnings advised: “Triggers are not only relevant to sexual misconduct, but also to anything that 
might cause trauma. Be aware of racism, classism, ableism, and other issues of privilege and 
oppression. Realize that all forms of violence are traumatic, and that your students have lives 
before and outside your classroom, experiences you may not expect or understand” (Friedersdorf 
2014, citing the Oberlin guide). 
Some students argue that even those who have not suffered a specific traumatic event can 
be triggered by mentions of systemic forms of oppression if they are members of a marginalized 
group, writes Colleen Flaherty (2014), a journalist for Inside Higher Ed. This understanding of 
trigger warnings substantially expands what should be marked as potentially troublesome.  
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It’s this understanding that Lukianoff and Haidt, among others, challenge as overzealous. 
They find that the tendency for students to assume others will find material triggering, without 
actually being triggered themselves, is a form of confirmation bias. “This is an example of what 
psychologists call ‘motivated reasoning’ — we spontaneously generate arguments for 
conclusions we want to support. Once you find something hateful, it is easy to argue that 
exposure to the hateful thing could traumatize some other people,” they write (Lukianoff & 
Haidt 2015). They also argue that trigger warnings are in fact psychologically harmful to those 
who really suffer from PTSD, because total avoidance of a triggering topic is not generally 
considered a healthy course of psychological treatment. Lukianoff and Haidt (2015) write, 
“Students with PTSD should of course get treatment, but they should not try to avoid normal life, 
with its many opportunities for habituation. Classroom discussions are safe places to be exposed 
to incidental reminders of trauma.” 
A. Speech Implications 
 Many also see the move to endorse trigger warnings as one step away from censorship.  
Some colleges (most notably Oberlin) have gone so far as to try to mandate trigger warnings, and 
63% of U.S. college students say they support mandatory trigger warnings in the classroom, 
according to a 2015 study cited by Robby Soave in a Reason.com article. While Oberlin soon 
retracted its policy, partially cited above, in the face of faculty backlash, Lukainoff and Haidt 
point out that the Oberlin task force that crafted the policy “recommended that materials that 
might trigger negative reactions among students be avoided altogether unless they ‘contribute 
directly’ to course goals, and suggested that works that were ‘too important to avoid’ be made 
optional.” As Jerry Coyne, a professor at The University of Chicago, points out in a 2015 New 
Republic article, famous works such as “Huckleberry Finn,” “The Great Gatsby,” and even the 
	   93 
Bible could fall under the umbrella of triggering content, and be discouraged under such a 
policy. 
 Some students have asked that triggering topics be abandoned entirely. Jeannie Suk, a 
law professor at Harvard University who teaches rape law, wrote about her experiences with 
such student requests in a 2014 New Yorker article. She writes, “One teacher I know was recently 
asked by a student not to use the word “violate” in class — as in ‘Does this conduct violate the 
law?’ — because the word was triggering. Some students have even suggested that rape law 
should not be taught because of its potential to cause distress” (Luk 2014). Luk adds that campus 
activists have encouraged her students to skip or disengage from class sessions relating to rape 
law if they might feel threatened by the materials, starkly contrasting Manne’s (2015) assertion 
that trigger warnings are not used to encourage dismissal of upsetting topics. Luk writes that 
faculty feel obligated to respond to students’ requests for trigger warnings “because it would be 
considered injurious for them not to acknowledge a student’s trauma or potential trauma.” 
Trigger warnings, Lukianoff and Haidt argue, have become a method for silencing unpopular 
viewpoints by claiming they are psychologically damaging to students or even the equivalent of 
physical violence. “Trigger warnings are sometimes demanded for a long list of ideas and 
attitudes that some students find politically offensive, in the name of preventing other students 
from being harmed,” the authors write (Lukianoff & Haidt 2015). In fact, in Luk’s case, she 
claims that trigger warnings are being used to sanitize class discussions in a manner that actually 
harms marginalized groups. She writes, “If the topic of sexual assault were to leave the law-
school classroom, it would be a tremendous loss — above all to victims of sexual assault” (Luk 
2015). In fact, the removal of rape law from law schools would set back curriculums to a time 
when rape law was largely not taken seriously as an area of study. The calls for trigger warnings 
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or even for students to ignore rape law suggest that students do not need to learn about rape law, 
when Luk argues its teaching is in fact critical to the protection of rape survivors. 
Thus, while some consider trigger warnings to be little more than a “spoiler,” others find 
that their effect on the classroom has been a chilling one. The speech implications introduced by 
trigger warnings could impact the ways in which professors feel comfortable engaging in class 
discussions, or even whether they bring up certain topics at all, according to many opponents. 
Although mandatory trigger warnings have not and may never become widely embraced at 
colleges and universities, their potential implications for free speech, should they become more 
accepted in the near future, have yet to be understood. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: PROPOSALS AND CONCLUSIONS 
I. Introduction 
The judiciary has, perhaps understandably, struggled with free speech questions since its 
inception as a branch of the U.S. government. In the area of hate speech, in particular, the courts 
have attempted to balance the competing interests of individual rights and the needs of the 
community. For the most part, as was demonstrated in Chapter Three, the Supreme Court and 
lower courts have granted individual freedoms much more weight than communal values in this 
balance. Colleges, in particular, failed in the 1980s and ’90s to introduce measures that both 
protected students from hate speech and fit into the judiciary’s narrow requirements for speech 
regulations. There continues to be much debate over whether the courts have struck an adequate 
balance, or whether the courts’ rulings have exaggerated the importance of individual speech 
rights while failing to acknowledge the damage words can do to both individuals and their 
communities.  
That debate has, in large part, taken place on college campuses, where many students 
believe their college’s obligation to create a comfortable and welcoming environment outweighs 
its obligation to foster a vigorous marketplace of ideas, in contrast to the balance the courts have 
struck. This tension between the courts and college students has left colleges unsure how to 
move forward, students unhappy with the current state of affairs, and free speech advocates 
displeased as some schools, both private and public, have chosen to implement speech codes in 
spite of the courts’ rulings. (According to FIRE, 55% of the 400 private and public colleges the 
organization surveyed in 2015 have speech codes in place that “clearly and substantially 
restric[t] freedom of speech” (FIRE 2015)). No one is happy with the current system. 
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In the midst of this complex situation I would like to forward three proposals, with the 
goal of determining how best to navigate today’s speech debates on college campuses. These 
proposals will represent different ways in which new issues, like microaggressions and trigger 
warnings, and can be considered and dealt with, although the proposals will not present ways of 
solving the problem that will please everyone. My analyses will include (1) information 
regarding where the proposals fall between the liberal and communitarian models, as well as (2) 
their likelihood of success in the courts based on judicial precedent. Each will consider whether 
the courts’ approach to these issues has been adequate or not.  
The proposals are essentially compromises, in which both sides would be required to 
make concessions to varying degrees. Each proposal will balance individual freedoms against 
communal values differently. Not every proposal will seem feasible or even desirable to 
everyone. However, it is important to understand what options are available so that we can 
proceed in a knowledgeable manner as we work through the thicket of individual rights and 
equal protection at colleges and universities across the United States. Although public schools 
are most affected by this issue because of their federal mandates, private schools may also wish 
to consider ways in which they can offer both a welcoming environment and intellectual freedom 
to their students. 
A. Proposal One: Speech codes should be entirely abandoned because they infringe 
upon individual rights. 
 
 This proposal fits best into the liberal speech framework laid out in Chapter Two and is 
the most supported by jurisprudence. It is also the least compromising of the three proposals. 
This proposal is based upon the notion that speech codes run entirely contrary to constitutional 
principles because any regulation of speech on the basis of its content is unacceptable. 
Particularly at colleges, where students should be grappling with uncomfortable new ideas in an 
	   97 
open environment, speech codes are indefensible. The first wave of speech codes in the 1980s 
and ’90s demonstrated this through the numerous examples wherein students were unjustly 
punished for protected speech, and many of the speech battles happening now on college 
campuses are likely to have the same fundamental flaws. A 2007 article in The Chronicle of 
Higher Education reported that “most college and university speech codes would not survive a 
legal challenge,” according to FIRE (Lipka 2007). As the free speech jurisprudence discussed in 
previous chapters demonstrates, any speech code that regulates speech on the basis of content 
should be considered with the utmost caution. In the Supreme Court case of R.A.V. v. City of St. 
Paul, the majority found St. Paul’s content-based regulation of fighting words to be facially 
unconstitutional, while in the district court case Iota Xi Chapter of Sigma Chi Fraternity v. 
George Mason University, one judge argued in a concurring opinion that a content-based 
regulation could be permissible, but only if it passed strict scrutiny by demonstrating that it 
accomplished a compelling state interest through narrowly tailored means. No college’s speech 
code has yet met this stringent standard. 
 It also no longer seems possible to craft a speech code that targets only fighting words. 
Although several colleges have tried, the courts have consistently found that speech codes cover 
more than just fighting words. Cases from the first wave of speech codes repeatedly found that 
colleges went too far in their attempts to regulate fighting words. Initially, the Court in 
Chaplinsky enumerated several conditions of the fighting words doctrine: 
Those [words] which (1) by their very utterance inflict injury or (2) tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are (3) no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are (4) of such slight social value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality. (315 U.S. 568, 572) [numbers added for clarity] 
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A civil liberties-oriented liberal would likely argue that this definition was too expansive to 
begin with, and would support the significant narrowing of Chaplinsky that has occurred in the 
decades since the decision. During the first wave of speech codes, lower courts consistently 
applied only part two of the Chaplinsky guidelines, requiring that speech codes limit solely 
speech that “cause[s] people to react violently” (Corry v. Stanford 8). This narrowing of 
Chaplinsky is a step in the right direction, from the liberal perspective. As such, we should 
readily accept the courts’ new and narrowed conception of fighting words (if not push for a 
complete overturn of Chaplinsky), and acknowledge that colleges have repeatedly failed to craft 
speech policies that fit into this version of the fighting words doctrine.  
During both the first wave of speech codes and the current resurgence of speech 
restrictions, colleges’ attempts to prohibit hateful or offensive speech have ended with the 
regulation of protected speech. As discussed in Chapter Four, some colleges (notably the public 
University of California) have discouraged professors and students from making use of 
microaggressions, including opinion-based phrases such as “I believe the most qualified person 
should get the job” (in relation to affirmative action policies). Eugene Volokh (2015) writes for 
The Washington Post that, while UC’s guidelines were not mandatory, they strongly suggested 
that the use of microaggressions — as defined by the listener — could contribute to the creation 
of “‘hostile learning environments,’ which the university and the federal government views as 
legally actionable.” Volokh argues that by defining certain viewpoints as racial 
microaggressions, the university labels those views racist and insinuates that they are not 
welcome in the classroom. Microaggression trainings thus chill particular viewpoints, but also 
generally target specific content — content that is likely to be considered offensive by a 
particular group. Even if microaggression trainings did not attempt to limit the expression of 
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specific views, they would remain problematic in their attempts to limit certain areas of 
discussion to what is deemed inoffensive by listeners. 
 Like microaggression trainings, trigger warnings have become a frequent demand of 
students and administrators, although trigger warnings have not yet been widely adopted. Trigger 
warnings are distinct from microaggressions in that they do not neatly fit into the fighting words 
doctrine (and thus have less grounding in jurisprudential history), but they remain a viewpoint- 
and content-based speech regulation that, under R.A.V., must be considered highly suspect. A 
2015 National Coalition Against Censorship (NCAC) survey found that 62% of college faculty 
surveyed believed trigger warnings had an adverse effect on academic freedom. The survey 
quoted one professor who said trigger warnings require “teachers to change their teaching plans 
based on calculations about what topics might hurt students' feelings or make them feel ‘unsafe’” 
(NCAC 2015, 4). The Court is unlikely to ever accept a mandatory trigger warning policy that 
impacts the content of classes or the way certain works are labeled because of the warnings’ 
chilling effect on speech and likely implications for academic freedom. Although students may 
clamor for mandatory trigger warnings, they remain viewpoint- and content-based regulations of 
speech that the Court will likely find perilous. 
 Not only do colleges’ speech regulations infringe free speech, but they also fail to 
achieve their goals. Conor Friedersdorf writes in a 2015 article for The Atlantic entitled “The 
Lessons of Bygone Speech Fights” that “there is no evidence that hate speech or bigotry 
decreased on any campus that adopted [a speech code].” He adds that under the University of 
Michigan’s speech code, black students were accused of violating the code 20 times, while the 
only two students who were punished under the code were both penalized “for speech by or on 
behalf of blacks” (Friedersdorf 2015, citing Marcia Pally). Speech codes place the power to 
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decide what speech is acceptable in the hands of college administrators. But as an occupation, 
73.5% of college administrators are white, according to 2013 statistics from the U.S. Department 
of Labor (Department of Labor 2013). To liberals, this is the fundamental problem underlying all 
speech codes: someone must be in charge of deciding what speech is acceptable and what speech 
is not. Whether that person is a white administrator or not, there will necessarily be some amount 
of personal bias or judgment brought into the decision making process. Students who ask for 
speech codes have underestimated the potential fallout of putting college administrators, no 
matter their race, gender, or religion, in charge of the crucial decision of what speech can be 
allowed in what should be a free marketplace of ideas. 
Speech codes appear to be unsuccessful in their aims of protecting minority students, and 
may even penalize minority students for their attempts to raise awareness of racial problems.  
Thus, Proposal One suggests that we accept the decisive findings of the lower courts and reject 
speech codes in favor of alternative measures for preventing hate speech, such as rigorous 
classroom discussions of its effects. 
B. Proposal Two: Speech codes can be constructed in narrowly tailored ways that pass 
strict scrutiny and still allow for the protection of state interests in equal educational 
opportunities. 
 
 Proposal Two advocates attempting to fit speech codes into the narrow space left open by 
the lower courts after the first wave of speech codes failed to pass muster. This is the approach 
recommended in Judge Murnaghan’s concurrence in Iota Xi v. George Mason University and in 
Judge Stone’s majority in Corry v. Stanford. Both judges proposed applying the strict scrutiny 
standard of review to campus speech codes to determine whether the codes were permissible in 
spite of the fact that they regulated speech on the basis of content. George Mason University and 
Stanford University’s codes were both found to fail strict scrutiny, which requires that a law or 
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policy be a narrowly tailored means of achieving compelling state interests, on the grounds that 
the codes were not narrowly tailored. The analyses found in these decisions, however, provide 
insights into how a speech code might be crafted to pass strict scrutiny.  
 The Supreme Court acknowledged in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul that there are compelling 
interests to be found in protecting individuals from hate speech. Although the majority in R.A.V. 
found the St. Paul ordinance facially unconstitutional, it considered (and ultimately rejected) the 
strict scrutiny standard of review in its analysis. Justice Scalia wrote in that case that St. Paul’s 
ordinance did further compelling interests: it sought “to ensure the basic human rights of 
members of groups that have historically been subjected to discrimination, including the right of 
such group members to live in peace where they wish. We do not doubt that these interests are 
compelling, and that the ordinance can be said to promote them” (505 U.S. 377, 395). The same 
logic was applied to campus speech codes in Corry v. Stanford, when the university’s interest in 
protecting students from “hateful discrimination” was found to be compelling (18). 
 Thus, campus speech codes aimed at protecting students from discrimination are likely to 
meet at least the first half of the strict scrutiny standard of review. The second half, that the codes 
be narrowly tailored, has proven more difficult. In Corry v. Stanford, Judge Stone offered a 
thorough list of possible ways to combat hate speech in more narrowly tailored ways: 
Defendants could continually press upon their students through their school calendars 
and handbooks, etc., the need to be respectful of each other.  Defendants could 
implement programs to educate students against discrimination.  Defendants also might 
through various campus media or sponsorship of events, i.e., guest speakers, movies, 
book readings and reviews, roundtable discussions, forums, panels, field trips, essay 
contests, etc., promote diversity and tolerance among students. (18–19) 
 
One possible solution is to limit speech codes strictly to fighting words without regard to their 
content, as proposed in R.A.V. (505 U.S. 377, 395). However, because of the limitations of the 
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fighting words doctrine that have been imposed since Chaplinsky, this would mean speech codes 
would only be able to limit speech that causes a violent outburst.  
This would substantially limit the scope of campus speech codes as they were devised 
during the first wave; such a code would likely not even apply to microaggressions because they 
are, by definition, “commonplace” slights, according to Derald Wing Sue et al. (2007, 271).  
Trigger warnings would fall well outside the regulatory scope of a code that was limited by the 
fighting words doctrine. Such a code would only limit the most vile speech, but it would do so 
more broadly in the sense that it would limit all fighting words, not just those based upon race or 
gender. Shiell points out that some scholars have called for “narrowly defined code[s] that target 
only the most egregious cases, such as threats, harassment, and mass theft of newspapers” (1998, 
90). Proposal Two takes as a given the extremely limited nature of the fighting words doctrine as 
the courts currently use it; as such, speech codes that seek to remain within the doctrine’s limits 
would be unlikely to prevent all of the speech that creates a hostile environment for students on 
college campuses. However, because such a code would also have to be content neutral, it would 
likely sweep up fighting words that were outside the intended scope of the speech code. Any 
hateful or rude speech between two individuals that caused the listener to react violently would 
be punishable under such a speech code. 
A content-neutral code based upon the fighting words doctrine (understood as words that 
cause violence) might be able to pass through the judiciary. It is also possible, however, that the 
Supreme Court would be willing to further limit the fighting words doctrine. The doctrine has, 
by now, been essentially overruled sub silentio because of the number of limitations the Court 
has imposed on it since Chaplinsky. It is possible the Court might be willing to finally overturn 
the fighting words doctrine or change it in some way that could not be predicted by a college 
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trying to craft a constitutional speech code. As such, while Proposal Two would limit some 
hateful speech and might stand a chance in the judiciary because it would conceivably pass strict 
scrutiny, it would be unsatisfactory in other ways: it requires that speech trigger violence before 
it can be applied, meaning current speech debates over trigger warnings and microaggressions 
would be left out; it might sweep up unintended speech; and it might not pass through the courts 
in spite of colleges’ best efforts. The use of the fighting words doctrine as laid out by the lower 
courts also problematically allows for a “fighter’s veto,” or a heckler’s veto that allows for 
anyone who is willing to engage in violence after hearing something offensive to limit speech 
based upon their view of what is offensive.  
Proposal Two is a compromise in that both liberals and communitarians would agree with 
aspects of it — liberals would be reluctantly gratified that only a very limited amount of speech 
was being regulated, while communitarians would praise the limitation of fighting words 
because they lack social value. But neither camp would wholly approve, and in fact Proposal 
Two seems mostly to lack aspects that would truly benefit either side of this debate. Because of 
its limited understanding of fighting words, this proposal would fail to protect minority and 
female students in any instances they did not respond to speech with violence, displeasing 
communitarians, but would still limit speech to an extent liberals would not approve of.  
C. Proposal Three: The fighting words doctrine should be revitalized to account for 
power imbalances and for the psychological and educational “injury” caused by speech 
that prevents equal access to educational opportunities. 
 
 Proposal Three is the most communitarian and the most radical because it requires a 
complete rethinking of the fighting words doctrine. As it currently stands (and is being used by 
the courts), the fighting words doctrine has been almost entirely overturned. Only speech that 
causes a violent response can currently fall under the category of fighting words. This covers so 
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little speech as to be absurd. The idea that any kind of speech code could successfully predict 
which speech is going to cause a violent response is unreasonable. The current understanding of 
fighting words also fails to account for power imbalances in any given confrontation. As 
discussed in Chapter One, and pointed out by Charles Lawrence, a fighting words doctrine that 
requires a violent response assumes that power between the two parties — the speaker and the 
target — is equal. However, if a person of color is accosted by several white men, or if a woman 
is confronted by a man much larger than herself and targeted by hateful speech, speech that 
would be considered fighting words if the target responded violently, it is unreasonable to expect 
the target to try to physically attack the speaker, who may be able to seriously harm the target. 
To make a violent response the sole requirement of the fighting words doctrine unfairly hurts 
women and minorities’ chances of being able to regulate fighting words and makes it difficult to 
truly address hate speech from a legal perspective.  
If the Court is not going to overturn the doctrine completely, it should consider ways to 
reinvigorate it. Primarily, the Court should return to the initial definition of fighting words 
provided in Chaplinsky, particularly the requirement that the words “by their very utterance 
inflict injury” (315 U.S. 568, 572). Although the Court has said time and again that hurt feelings 
are not enough to justify the regulation of speech, the Court in Chaplinsky understood that words 
could inflict injury, could upset the public peace, and could cause violence and other illegal 
actions. The Court in Chaplinsky stated specifically that, if a reasonable person considered 
speech “likely to cause an average addressee to fight,” the speech could be considered fighting 
words (315 U.S. 568, 53). Nowhere does this original stipulation require that the listener actually 
fight; rather, it leaves room for interpretation of which words cause injury and are likely to stir 
the average person to violence. 
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This conception of fighting words might seem to offer a heckler’s veto to anyone who is 
“injured” by speech, but it does not offer much more of a veto than does the current conception 
of fighting words, which offers a veto to anyone willing to engage in violence. If the Court is 
willing to accept the “fighter’s veto,” there is not a significant leap to be made in allowing the 
less physically powerful to “fight” against speech through alternative means than physical 
violence. Particularly if the listener can demonstrate an injurious effect of certain speech, there 
must be recourse in the form of a more expansive fighting words doctrine. 
 There is a distinction to be made between hurt feelings and legitimate claims to injury 
caused by the buildup of racial and gendered microaggressions. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
microaggressions are associated with psychological and physiological health symptoms and can 
have a negative impact on the academic success of minority students. If students who are 
primarily the targets of microaggressions are losing out on educational opportunities due to 
discrimination, they are indeed being injured by hateful speech. As such, the fighting words 
doctrine should be applied to allow schools to protect students from hateful language, including 
microaggressions.  
 Proposal Three also calls for the Court to recognize that some words cause greater injury 
than others, and allow for a very limited use of content-based speech regulations within the 
category of fighting words. As Charles Lawrence (1990) argues, hate speech on the basis of 
membership in an oppressed class is especially pernicious because of the United States’ history 
of discrimination against those groups. Lawrence gives the example of his student, Michael, who 
had, on one occasion, been referred to as a “faggot” in relation to his sexual orientation, and on 
another occasion, been referred to as a “mick” in relation to his Irish heritage (1990, 455). 
Michael says that the experience of being called a “faggot” was far worse, in terms of his 
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emotional response, than being called a “mick” (1990, 456). As a result, Lawrence writes, “The 
question of power, of the context of the power relationships within which speech takes place, 
must be considered as we decide how best to foster the freest and fullest dialogue within our 
communities” (1990, 456). The Court must take these power relationships into consideration and 
find that some speech causes greater injury than others — in some cases, very palpable injury — 
and can be regulated on the basis of content for that reason. Such a reinvention of the fighting 
words doctrine would be beneficial because it would take into account the serious harms caused 
by racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination, and allow for colleges to regulate speech to 
thwart those harms. 
 In addition to revitalizing the fighting words doctrine, the Court could also allow for 
regulations of speech that has the intention of intimidating the listener, using the logic in Virginia 
v. Black. In that case, the Court determined that cross burning that was intended to intimidate 
those who saw it could be banned, particularly if the ban did not distinguish between “types” of 
intimidation, such as intimidation based upon race or religious belief. Although cross burning is 
a type of expressive conduct, the Court decided that it could be banned if it was done with the 
purpose of intimidating others. This logic could be easily applied to intimidating speech on 
college campuses — if it can be shown that speech or expressive conduct was undertaken with 
the intent of intimidating a person or group, that speech or conduct could be banned. Like in 
Virginia v. Black, schools would not be able to distinguish between types of intimidation 
(intimidation based on race, religion, or gender, for example), but it could ban intimidating 
speech completely while remaining within the confines of Supreme Court jurisprudence. If the 
Court were to accept this reading of Virginia v. Black, this would provide a possible method for 
schools to protect their students from speech intended to intimidate them. Thus, there are two 
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opportunities to protect students from hateful speech contained within the Court’s decisions: a 
revitalization of the fighting words doctrine, and the use of the “intent to intimidate” standard of 
speech and conduct. 
Trigger warnings do not fit neatly into the fighting words doctrine, and should not be 
forced into the framework. They present a different challenge than microaggression trainings. 
However, triggering material, when presented without warning, has the potential to prevent 
access to education for those students who are affected negatively. Although trigger warnings do 
not fall under the fighting words doctrine, it is possible they could be considered acceptable if 
they (1) do not result in the alteration or censorship of class topics, which many proponents 
argue is the case, and (2) are found to be necessary to offering an equal educational opportunity 
to students who suffer from PTSD and similar mental illnesses. Students who suffer from sudden 
triggering events lose out on educational opportunities if they cannot attend class due to 
traumatic flashbacks.  
If trigger warnings are only used to warn these students about potentially hazardous 
material, and not to censor topics, they could be found acceptable even at public schools. Under 
Proposal Three, this would be the most desirable outcome because it allows for greater equality 
of academic opportunities. For some guidance, we can look to Chaplinsky, which stipulates that 
fighting words may only be limited when they are “of such slight social value as a step to truth 
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality” (315 U.S. 568, 572). Trigger warnings could only be deemed acceptable, 
even under Proposal Three, if they did not censor any speech that has enough social value 
(probably most material covered in college classes) to outweigh the potential harms of the 
material. 
	   108 
Proposal Three would be acceptable to communitarians because it considers the context 
and history surrounding speech, and allows for limited speech regulations of largely valueless 
speech to ensure that members of the community feel safe and able to advance in their 
educations. Liberals would find Proposal Three objectionable because it expands the fighting 
words doctrine and allows for speech codes in the interest of improving diversity and pluralism 
at colleges, contradicting the fundamental liberal principle that totally free speech is best for 
society. 
II. Conclusions 
 Choosing from among these proposals is a difficult task, especially after spending months 
researching some of the more appalling racist and sexist speech that has occurred and continues 
to occur daily on college campuses. It is an understandable impulse, both on the part of college 
students and administrators, to want to put a stop to such speech (and, in some cases, expressive 
conduct) and to want to create an environment where all students feel welcome. Not only that, 
but public colleges are required by federal law to provide equal educational opportunities to 
students regardless of race, gender, religion, or any other characteristic. It is clear is that students 
of color and female students who are forced to cope with regular outbursts of hateful speech are 
at a disadvantage compared to their white male peers who can avoid devoting any emotion or 
energy to thinking about, responding to, and feeling the anger associated with hate speech. It also 
seems clear from the literature that students who are subjected to frequent microaggressions are 
legitimately harmed — many suffer psychological and physiological effects that can have an 
impact on educational performance. 
 What is not clear from all this is how to deal with the current free speech debates 
occurring on college campuses. It is tempting to agree with many scholars in concluding that 
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speech regulations will create a more open environment in which a greater plurality of voices can 
be heard. It is tempting to agree that little or nothing of value is lost when speech regulations are 
put in place, while we gain the immense value of the voices of marginalized students who might 
not have spoken otherwise. These are goals of the utmost importance. Colleges should be making 
every effort to provide an environment in which all students feel able to contribute to the 
academic discussions happening on their campuses. It is my contention that in perfect conditions, 
with all participants acting in good faith, it might be possible to enact speech regulations that 
only regulate hate speech that’s intended to push some members out of a community. 
However, I cannot conclude that speech regulations are an appropriate measure for the 
simple reason that they are already being and have already been abused. It is true that many 
media outlets choose to present only the most ridiculous examples of current speech debates like 
microaggressions and trigger warnings. I have attempted to avoid this practice in my own 
writing. But the fact remains that at many college campuses, students and administrators are 
calling for uses of speech regulations that demonstrate their lack of good faith. Students at 
several colleges, most notably Yale, have forced administrators to resign over expressions of 
sincere ideas. Trigger warning advocates, as Jeannie Luk (2015) memorably notes in her New 
Yorker piece, have suggested that rape law should not be taught because of its triggering content. 
Administrators have suggested to professors that triggering material, or opinions that could be 
viewed as microaggressions, are to be avoided. These examples are enough, in my view, to 
suggest that speech regulations can easily make the leap from protecting students to silencing 
speech on the basis of content or viewpoint. 
Further, consider the fact that the original University of Michigan speech code was used 
primarily against black students or those who were engaging in speech on behalf of black 
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students. A similar scenario is easily conceivable within the framework of microaggressions and 
trigger warnings. Indeed, Luk’s example demonstrates that trigger warnings are being requested 
in harmful ways that seek to exclude information that is both triggering and important to 
protecting marginalized groups. 
There are ways for schools to improve educational access without using speech 
regulations. Professors can elect to provide their classes with warnings before difficult material 
as a matter of courtesy, not out of a fear of retribution from students or administrators. Many 
professors already consider it an important part of their jobs to provide detailed syllabi that 
explain what course material will be discussed, according to the 2015 National Coalition Against 
Censorship report on trigger warnings. Administrators, students, and professors can do their best 
(and certainly continue to do better) to be alert to their internalized biases and to be cognizant of 
the ways in which their speech might be hurtful to students of color, women, or religious 
students.  
Colleges can also use measures that target hateful conduct, harassment, and intimidation 
without infringing upon speech. Policies that prohibit intimidating speech and conduct of all 
kinds can prevent large swaths of hateful speech without regulating on the basis of content. 
Policies that prohibit vandalism can punish those who write racial epithets on school property 
without declaring epithets a special category of speech that must be prohibited. These measures 
are excellent alternatives to the content- and viewpoint-based speech regulations being proposed 
and implemented at colleges today.  
Most importantly, colleges can educate students on the vast number of cultures from 
which their students originate. Rather than declaring some viewpoints outdated and offensive, 
colleges can offer a range of viewpoints and let students decide from among them. Schools can 
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facilitate and encourage discussions and debates that include diverse viewpoints in a literal 
interpretation of the “marketplace of ideas.” For those students who are unaffected and continue 
to use speech that is intended to intimidate on the basis of race, gender, religion, and other 
characteristics, schools can fall back on stronger enforcement of content-neutral harassment 
policies and prevent egregious intimidation without making a determination as to which content 
is acceptable and which is not. 
In the meantime, it is truly unfair that some students are more affected by hateful speech 
than others. The burden too often falls on the same groups of students to bear the weight of their 
peers’ ignorance. However, speech codes and regulations have proven to be poor vehicles for the 
change that these students seek. Speech codes often backfire, and they invite appropriation by 
those in power. They simultaneously fail to protect students from hateful speech while also 
stifling the marketplace of ideas by making other students feel they cannot speak on certain 
issues. I submit that they are not the solution to the speech issues being debated now, although 
the debate will certainly continue to rage on. 
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